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Abstract
After the First World War the international order was reorganized by the victorious powers,
including the creation of the League of Nations, and under its supervision the mandates system.
This system was designed to manage the colonies detached from the defeated Central Powers
and to mitigate the worst effects of colonialism through international oversight and the
imposition of conditions on the rule of these territories. This paper investigates the origins of this
system, tracing it back through earlier precedents and discerning between different variations of
colonialism practiced by different empires. This analysis shows that the mandates system was an
Americanized version of colonialism, created through compromises between President Wilson’s
ideology and European and colonial politics. This paper utilizes diplomatic documents to analyze
the precedents for the system and to understand how the United States changed European
colonialism in the captured territories to match its preferred colonial methodologies.
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Lay Summary
After the First World War the international order was reorganized by the victorious powers,
including the creation of the League of Nations, and under its supervision the mandates system.
This system was designed to manage the colonies detached from the defeated Central Powers
and to mitigate the worst effects of colonialism through international oversight and the
imposition of conditions on the rule of these territories. This paper investigates the origins of this
system, tracing it back through earlier precedents and discerning between different variations of
colonialism practiced by different empires. This analysis shows that the mandates system was an
Americanized version of colonialism, created through compromises between President Wilson’s
ideology and European and colonial politics. This paper utilizes diplomatic documents to analyze
the precedents for the system and to understand how the United States changed European
colonialism in the captured territories to match its preferred colonial methodologies.
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Introduction:
After the First World War, the great powers reconstructed the international order by
creating a new international institution, the League of Nations, with explicit norms and rules to
direct and manage international relations. This revised international order saw the creation of
new states in the territories of the defeated Central Powers in Europe. The League of Nations and
the concept of self-determination were the underpinnings of this new order and both bore the
clear impress of American support for democracy and law as the foundations of international
order, stated most clearly in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech. American influence and
ideas also influenced the creation of the mandates system, whereby colonial powers administered
the former colonial territories of the German and Ottoman empires. Ostensibly designed to serve
the interests of the indigenous populations of these territories and with the goal of achieving selfgovernment, the mandates system perpetuated imperial relations, dynamics, and hierarchies.
Although the United States was never a mandatory power, its influence on the creation of the
system is evident in the internationalization and legalization of the mandates system, the
application of the open-door principle, and in making self-government a central and achievable
goal of the system in the not distant future. The effects of Americanization were contradictory,
simultaneously perpetuating imperial systems and setting in place conditions for the end of
empire.
American ideas about the mandates system emerged from the country’s own experience
as an imperial ruler in the American West and the Philippines, and in its neo-colonial relations
with Latin America and China. American colonial thinking was distinctive in its focus on the
application of open trade and the principle of self-government, though there was a great deal of
overlap with the imperial ideologies of European states. The belief that the United States would
civilize peoples perceived as less developed and sophisticated echoed the French mission
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civilatrise and the British concept of the white man’s burden, though with a distinctive focus on
self-government as the primary goal of the American civilizing mission. Ideas about race and
race-thinking informed these concepts of civilizing missions for both the Americans and
Europeans, based on assumptions of the superiority of white peoples and their civilizations over
their counterparts in the colonial world. Here one finds little to differentiate American
colonialism from its European equivalents, there being a shared conception of white superiority
and a vaguely defined hierarchy of races that generally placed Asian peoples in an intermediate
position, and African and Pacific peoples at the bottom. One finds clear indications of these
shared concepts in the design of the mandates system through its three-tiered structure that
followed the perceived racial hierarchy in levels of civilization. Despite the overlapping beliefs
that legitimized their roles as colonial powers and defined the conception of civilizing missions,
it is possible to discern a discrete American influence on the mandates system both through their
forceful position at the negotiating table and through the influence of their distinctive strain of
colonial ideology and rhetoric.

Sources and Methodology
My analysis relies on a number of primary sources from the United States, Britain, and
the League of Nations, most of which are available digitally. Because of the closure of archives
and prohibitions on international travel I have also had to rely on published sources such as the
Foreign Relations of the United States collection. Other key sources include the texts of the
mandate agreements, and legal instruments such as the Covenant of the League of Nations, and
various international treaties concerning the mandates and related developments. The writings of
Woodrow Wilson, George Louis Beer, Harold Nicholson, and others who were directly involved
with the Paris Peace Conference and the creation of the mandates system are also useful, though
they require close reading to get past self-serving agendas and the typical challenges of the
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recollections of participants. One can occasionally find direct references in these sources to
American precedents in relation to the mandates. For example, Sir James Allen of New Zealand
cited the policies pursued by the United States in the Philippines as precedent for the
maintenance of a distinct nationality status for the inhabitants of mandated territories.1 Such
references are infrequent. Instead, I rely on similarities between the mandates system and its
ideological underpinnings to those of the United States in Latin America and the Philippines, as
well identifying the thoughts of key individuals such as President Wilson and comparing them
with the ideologies and practices that formed the mandates system.
In addition to these primary sources, my analysis rests on a voluminous secondary
literature, much of which deals with the question of mandates as it relates to broader questions of
the postwar peace settlements, changes to the international order, or to the beginnings of
decolonization movements. There are also many works that deal with one or a few mandates, as
opposed to the more systemic view taken by this paper. Finally, there are many works that look
at certain aspects of the mandates system, such as the system of petitions, which support my
analysis. Among the most influential secondary sources were Erez Manela’s 2007 book The
Wilsonian Moment, which discusses the impact of Wilsonian thought on the colonial world.
Whereas he traces the influence of the idea of self-determination at the grassroots level in
influencing anti-colonial movements in places such as Egypt, my analysis looks more at the
influence of Wilsonism at the systemic level of the mandates system and the League of Nations.2
Another influential author on this subject is Susan Pedersen, who has written numerous books
and articles connected with the mandates system. However, she and I differ in our interpretations
of the mandates system. She emphasizes the importance of international oversight as the major
1

"Sixth Meeting (Public)," League of Nations Official Journal, vol. 4, no. 6 (June 1923): 567-572,
pg. 569.
2
Erez Manela, 2007. The Wilsonian Moment : Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial
Nationalism New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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development of the mandates. While I agree that this was an important development, I place
considerably more emphasis on the structural changes to colonialism and the importance of selfgovernment and open-door economics facilitating the development of American-style
neocolonialism in mandated territories than does she.3 Pedersen also asserts that the mandates
system was largely a rhetorical development justifying colonialism in an era of Wilsonism, and
argues that the system did little to help mandated territories towards independence.4 This analysis
will refute that argument by noting how the principle of local self-government was embedded
into the mandates system, and how despite its short lifespan the system successfully brought
about Iraqi independence and membership within the League of Nations. The view of the
mandates as a device to cloak the continuation of prewar imperialism holds wide currency within
the existing literature, and is particularly prominent in more general histories of the aftermath of
the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference.5 Sometimes the argument is more nuanced,
noting that although there were novel features in the mandates system, they did not work
effectively, the system was, in many respects, functionally a continuation of previous European
colonial practices, and the mandatory regimes worked to perpetuate existing colonial practices to
these regions.6
In fact, many authors have concluded that the mandates were more than a means to
continue normative colonialism under the guise of a new rhetoric, but there is disagreement
about the origins and ideas underlying the mandates system. Andrew J. Crozier and Peter
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Susan Pedersen, 2006. “The Meaning of the Mandates System: An Argument.” Geschichte und Gesellschaft
(Göttingen) 32 (4): 560–82., 564-565.
4
Ibid., 568.
5
Alan Sharp, The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire:
Macmillan, 1991., 159.
6
Peter Sluglett, "An Improvement on Colonialism? The 'A' Mandates and Their Legacy in the Middle
East." International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 90, no. 2 (2014): 413-27. Accessed
January 11, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24538563., 425; Andrew J. Crozier, “The Establishment of the
Mandates System 1919-25: Some Problems Created by the Paris Peace Conference.” Journal of contemporary
history 14, no. 3 (July 1, 1979): 483–513., 483.

5
Sluglett assert that the mandates system originated in the thinking of the British Labour
movement, though they note that the system’s implementation was facilitated by the entry of the
United States into the war and the Bolshevik publication of secret treaties.7 I try to show that the
system originated in American colonial thought, and that although there were many British
figures involved in designing the mandates system, most prominently Jan Smuts and David
Lloyd George, the key features of the system reflect both American ideological precepts and
direct American influence at the negotiating table. As the central proposition of this paper is that
the mandates system was Americanized to a significant degree, the place of this claim within the
historiography of the mandates system must be understood. The mandates system was by
definition a compromise between imperialism and independence, offering neither the local
populations of the mandated territories nor the European imperialists unfettered control. Whether
this compromise was between the European imperialists and their left-wing counterparts, as
Andrew Crozier has argued, or between European imperialists and Bolshevik ideology to
ideologically defend imperialism, as some Cold War historians have contended, or whether this
was a compromise between European imperialism and American neocolonialism as I argue, it is
generally agreed that the mandates system was a compromise on the part of European
imperialism.

My argument also addresses debates about when the United States emerged as a global
superpower. Several historians have identified the years following the First World War that
American elites began to actively seek the Americanization of the global order.8 Some have
argued that Wilson’s Fourteen Points and Lloyd George’s related Caxton Hall Speech were
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Ibid., 484.
Patrick O. Cohrs, “‘Pax Americana’: The United States and the Transformation of the 20th Century’s Global
Order.” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 61, no. 2 (2018)., 1.
8
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rebuttals to Bolshevik ideology, and that the important principle of self-determination was
essentially designed to offer an ideological alternative to Bolshevism that could appeal to both
colonized peoples and colonial powers. More convincing is that for Wilson the ideological
challenge presented by the Bolsheviks was an opportunity to force the Europeans to accept his
ideology for the peace settlement.9 As I show in the first chapter, the ideology that Wilson
professed in his Fourteen Points speech can be traced back through his earlier academic writings
and to American precedents from the Philippines, Latin America, and the experience of the postCivil War American South, from which Wilson originated. While the Bolsheviks certainly
presented an ideological challenge to the West with their calls for an end to colonialism and the
dismantling of colonial empires, the rebuttal presented by Wilson, and accepted by the
Europeans, did not originate in an effort to respond to the Bolsheviks. Rather, the ideologies
present had a long genesis rooted in American history and principles. While the rise of
Bolshevism during the First World War helped convince the Europeans to accept American
solutions to problems in Eastern Europe and the colonial world, these ideas were not developed
as a response to Bolshevism. Rather, they were American ideas that the Europeans came to
accept as the price of resisting the encroachment of Communism onto their territories.
Some historians have also understood the mandates system as a reflection of American
influence on European colonial systems. For example, William Roger Louis, concluded that the
conception of the mandates system was very different between Britain and the United States, the
Americans imagining the system to be a more fundamental departure from previous colonial
methodologies than did the British, as well as imagining a stronger enforcement mechanism

9

David Stevenson, 1979. “French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914–1918.” The Historical Journal 22 (4):
877–94, 887; Alexander Anievas, 2014. “International Relations Between War and Revolution: Wilsonian
Diplomacy and the Making of the Treaty of Versailles.” International Politics (Hague, Netherlands) 51 (5): 619–47.
https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2014.26., 638; Trygve Throntveit, “The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson
and National Self-Determination.” Diplomatic History 35, no. 3 (June 1, 2011): 445–481., 458.

7
through the League.10 He also notes that the American ideas of the mandates system more
accurately embody the system that came into existence at the end of the Paris Peace
Conference.11 Hersch Lauterpacht writing in 1923, also believed that the mandates system was a
major departure from previous European colonialism, even arguing against Secretary of State
Robert Lansing when he contended that the system was merely a continuation of European
colonial practices.12 Lauterpacht also intepreted the intermediate status of the Palestine mandate
between classes A and B, and detected American influence in open-door economic provisions
being applied to the A mandates.13 Lauterpacht’s commentary on the mandates was legal,
offering many promising avenues for further research into the legal status of the mandates.14
Other contemporary authors such as Quincy Wright noted that American influence was
fundamental not only to the design of the mandates system but also to its implementation.15
Wright acknowledges that the mandatory idea originated with South African General Smuts, but
the system as designed went much further than Smuts had ever intended and reflects mainly
Wilson’s ideas about its design and implementation, as I discuss in chapter 2.16
Susan Pedersen notes that the mandates system was designed on beliefs concerning racial
hierarchies and the desire to “uplift” the indigenous inhabitants of mandated territories. She
further notes that in cases where the mandates system led to independence, it was only because
the mandatory power had calculated that such independence would be to their benefit. The
obvious example was Iraq, where the British facilitated Iraqi independence because a

10

William Roger Louis, “The United Kingdom and the Beginning of the Mandates System, 1919–
1922.” International organization 23, no. 1 (1969): 73–96., 93.
11
Ibid., 93-94.
12
Hersch Lauterpacht, and Elihu Lauterpacht. International Law, Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht.
Systematically Arranged and Edited by E. Lauterpacht. Cambridge [Eng: University Press, 1970., 37.
13
Ibid., 45, 47.
14
See for example the works of legal historian Cait Storr.
15
Quincy Wright, “The United States and the Mandates.” Michigan law review 23, no. 7 (May 1, 1925): 717–747.,
717.
16
Ibid., 717-718.
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neocolonial model served their interests equally well at a lower cost than administering the
territory directly.17 This is a clear indication that American colonial ideas and methodologies
were being adopted by the British in the mandates through their adoption of a neocolonial model
pioneered by the United States in Latin America. This is a clear departure from existing British
practices because although the British had often retained indigenous governing structures to
some degree, they had typically reserved a formal tutelage role for themselves rather than
granting nominal independence. They also generally worked to ensure that states under their
protection did not maintain strong relations with other European states or large non-British
companies, whereas the Americans were comfortable working with independent republics that
maintained relationships with other states but under a more informal umbrella in the form of the
Monroe Doctrine. That only Iraq became independent during the existence of the mandates
system is indicative of the success of the system rather than its failure; neither Wilson nor his
European counterparts envisioned the mandates system as leading to self-government quickly.
Rather, they imagined that like the American presence in the Philippines, the system would have
to exist for decades if not centuries in order to bring the “level of civilization” within these
territories to a point where they would be capable of self-government. Even if this level were
reached, self-government would still depend on the cooperation of the local government with the
material interests of the powers, an arrangement which bears a striking similarity to American
practices in Latin America. Overall, the current literature is divided over the nature of the
mandates system, and as Erez Manela and Robert Grewarth noted in 2014, the global history of
the aftermath of the First World War remains an understudied subject.18

17

Susan Pedersen, “Samoa on the World Stage: Petitions and Peoples before the Mandates Commission of the
League of Nations.” Journal of imperial and Commonwealth history 40, no. 2 (June 1, 2012): 231–261., 253.
18
Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela, “The Great War as a Global War: Imperial Conflict and the Reconfiguration of
World Order, 1911–1923*.” Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (September 2014): 786–800. doi:10.1093/dh/dhu027.,
787.

9

Chapter Summary and Structure of Argument
To demonstrate that the United States fundamentally altered the goals of colonialism, and
the methods by which it was regulated in the areas opened for negotiation after the war, in
chapter one I analyze intellectual developments in colonialism during the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, with a focus on the emerging role of the United States. This section will then analyze
the precedents that emerged before the First World War for the internationalization of the
colonial system through innovations such as the introduction of open-door economic policies in
the Congo during the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and innovations in international
administration as exemplified by the results of the Algeciras Conference of 1906. This chapter
concludes with analyses of wartime policy developments that produced the foundations for the
mandates system. The next chapter focuses on the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference
that produced the outlines of the mandates system. In this section, I examine how the United
States was able to push its conceptions of colonialism onto the European powers, with some
modifications, resulting in an Americanized framework for the system. This will show that key
American ideas developed through their colonial and neocolonial experiences in Latin America,
the Philippines, and the American West. The principal American ideas that shaped the mandates
system were open-door economic access for members of the League of Nations, and the
achievement of self-government for the indigenous inhabitants, ideas that find little precedent in
other colonial regimes. The final chapter analyzes the implementation of the mandates system
after the Paris Peace Conference, and after the United States withdrew from participation in the
League of Nations and failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, thus fundamentally changing the
nature of their relationship to the mandates system. This section shows that even after the United
States changed the nature of its participation in the system, the structure of the mandates still
reflected American ideas of colonialism, and the desire of the American government to enjoy
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open-door access to mandated territories led to a continued ability to influence the nature of
mandatory administrations. Finally, I provide an overview of each of the mandates and the
compromises that facilitated their implementation, explaining the on-going role of the United
States and the adherence of the mandates to American precedents. This section concludes with a
brief discussion of the Iraq mandate, which was the only mandate to achieve independence and
self-government prior to the Second World War. In Iraq, Britain adopted American neocolonial
models to facilitate continued resource-extraction while reducing the burden of administration by
working through an indigenous government. Through these chapters, I demonstrate that the
mandates system was an Americanized version of European colonialism, marking the beginning
of a transition towards neocolonial forms of political and economic control that culminated after
the Second World War. The present analysis deals only with the mandates system, and primarily
with the design of the system. This is the tip of the iceberg to understanding how the United
States shaped the colonial order in the first half of the twentieth century, with the mandates
serving as a model for the United Nations Trusteeships that were created after the Second World
War, and which led into the process of decolonization in the second half of the twentieth century.
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Chapter 1: The Origins and Precedents of the Mandates System
This chapter examines the origin of the mandates system in relation to changes to
colonialism that occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the wartime
discussions among the Allied and Associated Powers that led to the adoption of the system after
the war. I begin with an overview of the nature of colonialism at the turn of the twentieth
century, particularly the way its primary justification, the European civilizing mission, had
become an international project, albeit one with significant national variations. This overview
leads into an investigation of the intellectual background of international colonialism at this time,
to illustrate the American conception of the motives and objectives of the colonial project and
how this conception compared to those of their imperial partners, especially the British Empire. I
then analyze the implementation of internationalized colonialism prior to the First World War,
including such prominent examples as the Berlin Conference of 1885 and the Algeciras
Conference of 1906. This section highlights American contributions to the international colonial
ethos and system, and shows how the American conception of colonialism had been established
along neocolonial models in Latin America and elsewhere in which the United States undertook
a civilizing mission in conjunction with economic exploitation, while working to establish selfgovernment on the part of the local population. Finally, I examine the wartime policies and
developments that produced the mandates system.

European colonialism had been a powerful force for centuries, but starting in the late 19th
century there were important changes to the way it was conceived and practiced. Chief among
these were changes in the moral and legal justifications underlying the expansion of European
empires and the move away from traditional colonial methods of rule and in favour of more
indirect means of economically exploiting colonized regions. An early example of these changes
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was the mid-nineteenth-century shift from company rule in India to the administration of the
British Raj, with its litany of semi-independent Princely States and various mechanisms for
indirect rule.19 This new system reduced the burden of administration while simultaneously
working to reduce the incidence of violence between the colonizer and the colonized.20 This
trend towards indirect rule can also be seen in the British North America Act of 1867, in which
the stated objectives are “peace, order, and good government”.21 This must be understood in the
same vein as changes to Indian governance, as the British government wanted to reduce the
burden of its imperial holdings by moving towards limited self-government. The justification for
these changes, and indeed for its continued authority, was the concept that it was bringing good
government to the areas under its control. There was an almost pedagogical mission to teach
governance to those to whom the British government has delegated partial authority. Good
government and indirect rule were similar to American colonial ideology and practice, although
the Americans largely left local governments to handle their own affairs except where the United
States was directly interested, whereas the British preferred to keep residents or consuls in quasiindependent areas under their protection, and use these officials to ensure that such colonial
states would not have relationships with other European powers besides Britain.22 In this one can
detect the beginnings of the British civilizing mission, which not only underlay its administrative
decisions, but also formed the core justification for its continued imperialism.
The main derivative of British colonial thought, American colonialism, took on a
somewhat different shape. This can largely be attributed to American colonialism being directed

19

Joseph McQuade, “Beyond an Imperial Foreign Policy?: India at the League of Nations, 1919-1946.” Journal of
imperial and Commonwealth history 48, no. 2 (2020): 263–295., 271.
20
Kenneth Pomeranz, “Empire & ‘Civilizing’ Missions, Past & Present.” Daedalus (Cambridge, Mass.) 134, no. 2
(2005): 34–45., 38.
21
British North America Act, 1867, Section 91, pg. 33.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2132&context=rso
22
Susan Pedersen, 2015. The Guardians: the League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire New York, NY: Oxford
University Press., 25.
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to the extension of the United States through the establishment of self-governing states within the
federal union rather than the creation of subject areas overseas, a process that Thomas Jefferson
described as being the expansion of “an empire of liberty”.23 In the United States, there was less
emphasis on good government, though this is not absent, and more on the idea that an area
populated by “civilized” peoples ought to be able to form their own government and have it
recognized as sovereign by their peers, provided that it adhered to the basic guidelines for
democracy and individual rights as laid out in the United States Constitution.24 This concept is
also important during the process of Reconstruction that followed the Civil War. When the
Union army occupied large swaths of the South, the goal was the reinstatement of local state
governments, subject to conditions that find echoes in civilizing missions throughout the world
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as the abolition of slavery and the
extension of voting rights to the majority of the population. This was a formative period for
many of the key figures from the American delegation who would help to craft the mandates
system, including future President Woodrow Wilson, who was already in his sophomore year of
college when these troops departed from his hometown of Columbia, South Carolina.25
The United States joined the ranks of the European colonial empires through its
acquisition of the former Spanish territories of the Philippines and Puerto Rico, at which point a
major debate began in the U.S. over how they ought to rule their new territories.26 This marked a
major shift in the trajectory of the American colonialism, as it was no longer confined to dealing
with territories on the American continent, but now held overseas possessions that seemed
unlikely to be destined for statehood. Nonetheless, Woodrow Wilson believed that American

23

Kenneth Pomeranz, 36.
Edwin G. Arnold. Self-Government in U. S. Territories. Foreign Affairs, 1947, 655.
25
Harley A. Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson. New York: Russell & Russell, 1965., 14.
26
Christina Duffy Burnett. “Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation.” The University of
Chicago law review 72, no. 3 (2005): 797–879., 806.
24
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colonialism overseas continued to be an empire of liberty. For example, he believed that the
United States had invaded Cuba in order to liberate its inhabitants.27 Wilson understood
American expansion as motivated by a mixture of altruistic missions of liberation and
civilization coupled with economic self-interest. These two pillars of his colonial ideology also
applied to the Philippines, which he viewed as a necessary foothold for American commerce in
Asia, as well as serving as a “new frontier” for young American men on the grounds that “The
spaces of their own continent were occupied and reduced to the uses of civilization”.28 One finds
in Wilson’s thinking around this time some of his earliest references to the principle of selfdetermination, a concept that did not conflict in his mind with an armed imposition of American
authority in the Philippines against the clear wishes of the local population.29 Indeed, he believed
it was legitimate for the US to suppress armed revolt against American authority in the
Philippines: “We fought but the other day to give Cuba self-government. It is a point of
conscience with us that the Philippines shall have it, too, when our work there is done and they
are ready.”30 Clearly, the self-government that Wilson hoped to achieve in the Philippines was
not the same sort of self-government as that possessed by American states within the Union, nor
was it the same as the self-government possessed by a country such as Norway. Instead, the
model for self-government was Cuba and the other Latin American republics. This kind of selfgovernment must be understood as neocolonial: these countries could only govern themselves,
once they had been “civilized”, but their governance had to suit the interests of the U.S.
government and American corporations. If they did not, then they might be subject to an

27

Woodrow Wilson, A History of the American People. New York: Harper & brothers, 1903. Volume V.,270-272,
274.
28
Ibid., 296
29
Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961.,
4.
30
Woodrow Wilson, edited by Ray Stannard Baker, and William E. Dodd. The Public Papers of Woodrow
Wilson. Authorized ed. New York: Kraus Reprint, 1970. Volume I., 427-428.
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American military intervention, as Wilson himself was to in Haiti and the Dominican Republic.31
This conception of self-government and self-determination is fundamental to understanding
Wilsonian policies towards colonial areas administered as mandates.
Wilson’s conception of the American mission in the Philippines and in Latin America
was not restricted to him, nor to the Democratic party. President Taft, the first colonial governor
of the Philippines, created the colonial state according to this civilizing mission, and President
McKinley in his statements shortly after the acquisition of the Philippines made clear that selfgovernment was the eventual goal of the administration.32 Both Taft and Roosevelt were also
advocates of “Dollar Diplomacy” in the Caribbean, which bears a striking similarity to the
neocolonial practices of the Wilson administration despite his statements against the policy.33
While the League of Nations is generally associated with President Wilson, former President
Taft was one of its most important domestic advocates during the First World War and
subsequent Paris Peace Conference.34 This highlights the importance of American colonial
experience to Wilson’s project, and helps to show that for all of the divisions in the United States
regarding imperialism, there existed a broad conception of colonialism and the civilizing mission
among Americans that was distinct from those of the European colonial states.
While the British civilizing mission was based on the concept of extending good
government to its colonies and the American mission was devoted to the eventual extension of
self-government, the other colonial powers also had distinctive civilizing missions. But they
were united in their belief in the internationally interdependent character of the civilizing mission

31

David H. Burton, Taft, Wilson, and World Order. London; Madison [N.J.]: Fairleigh Dickenson [sic] Press, 2003.,
57.
32
Ibid., 29; Alpheus Henry Snow, “Neutralization Versus Imperialism.” The American journal of international law 2,
no. 3 (1908): 562–590., 577.
33
Ibid.; Alan L. McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended U.S.
Occupations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014., 5-6.
34
David H. Burton, 79.

16
despite its national variations.35 For most nations, the basic logic of their civilizing mission was
material: they would bring the technological advancements of European society to other parts of
the world, and this would “civilize” the peoples of these areas, a concept that can be traced at
least as far back as sixteenth-century Spanish colonialism.36 These European powers, among
them Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and eventually Germany, saw no issue with the
economic exploitation of the territories they were ostensibly “civilizing.” While the rhetorical
and legal justification of imperialism shifted towards the civilizing mission in the late nineteenth
century, the commercial exploitation of these regions must be understood as being at least
equally important to these European governments.37 This is significant because one of the basic
logics of earlier imperialisms had been protectionist economic policies in which the metropole
attempted to restrict access to colonial materials and markets within areas under its control.38 By
the late nineteenth century there was a marked movement away from this sort of protectionism in
newly acquired areas and towards an internationalized conception of the role of colonial areas as
being a free market in which any colonial power ought to be able to access resources and
markets as well as being able to undertake civilizing missions. One of the clearest expressions of
this shift is in the General Act of the Berlin Conference of 1885, whereby freedom of trade was
established throughout the Congo basin despite it being the private property of King Leopold
II.39
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The Berlin Conference was one of the earliest agreements among the European powers to
codify their cooperation in the colonial sphere and establish the European civilizing mission as
the primary justification for their presence in Africa.40 In the General Act of the Berlin
Conference, one can detect core features of this civilizing mission including the suppression of
the slave trade, the improvement of the material conditions of the indigenous inhabitants, and the
obligation to protect Christian missionaries working in Africa.41 The idea that the slave trade
violated the basic morality of “civilized” nations can be traced back to the moral and religious
conceptions in Britain in the early nineteenth-century, which expanded into other colonial
nations, including the United States by mid-century, and by the 1880s was held as an
international value of “civilized” morality.42 The change in attitudes towards slavery marked a
significant departure from older colonial justifications, and thus distinguish this period of new
imperialism from that of previous centuries.43 This notion of an international mission against
slavery reinforces the idea that the Berlin Conference marked a shift in ideas of colonialism from
a strictly national notion of conquest and reward towards the idea that the administration of
colonies involved both privileges and obligations, and that these obligations were owed to the
indigenous population because of agreements between the major powers. At the Paris Peace
Conference these same obligations, legitimated by agreements among the powers, became
codified under the supervision of the League of Nations. Indeed, one finds explicit reference to
the suppression of the slave trade in Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant which
established the mandates system, demonstrating the continuity between these international
colonial agreements.44
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The improvement of material conditions for colonial peoples is a vague concept, but it
can be understood as the intended result of the increase in trade relations with colonial areas, as
well as the imposition of European-style administrative structures, and thus connected to the
principle of good government.45 These trade relations formed the core of European interests in
the colonial sphere, with the civilizing mission serving as the justification for the imposition of
European authority. Although the Congo basin was theoretically opened to the trade of all
nations by the Berlin Conference, the government of the Congo actively worked to subvert this
internationalization by excluding most foreign trade.46 The arrangements emerging from this
conference lacked sufficient enforcement mechanisms for the internationalization of colonial
arrangements, a mistake that the negotiating parties at the Paris Peace Conference were careful to
avoid in the mandated territories.
The Berlin Act also facilitated the movement of Christian missionaries throughout Africa
so that they could spread Christian morality, generally seen as an integral part of the civilizing
mission.47 While the incorporation of Christian proselytizing had been a part of the older colonial
models of the Spanish and Portuguese empires, the Berlin Act marked an important
internationalization of the intersection of missionary activity and the civilizing mission by
recognizing that missionary work did not need to be undertaken with the permission of the
colonial state. This can be seen in the arrival of missionaries from European states that were not
involved in African colonization, such as Sweden, whose missionaries established numerous
outposts in the Congo Free State. This participation in the missionary aspect of the civilizing
mission helped to justify the continued commercial exploitation of colonial areas and legitimize
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the existing regimes in Africa despite their non-participation in colonial administration.48
Facilitating missionary activities was a continuation of previous colonial practices, but the
manner of its inclusion in the Berlin Act made explicit the international nature of the civilizing
mission of which the missionaries were a part. Significantly, this represents one of the first steps
towards the internationalization of the civilizing mission generally, as well as laying the
groundwork for other forms of international inclusion within a given nation’s colonial holdings,
such as the open-door trade provisions that were included within the mandates.
Although the Berlin Conference reflects relatively little American influence (the United
States did not even ratify the resulting Act), it marks an important moment for the
internationalization of the civilizing mission underpinning European colonial expansion in the
late nineteenth century. While one finds clear intimations of the conception of commercial
exploitation, the imposition of European moral precepts, and the notion of good government (of
the European variety), absent is any indication that the system was designed to result in any of
these colonial territories becoming self-governing in the foreseeable future, as would be the case
in an American civilizing mission.

Colonial Areas with Existing Governments: China and Morocco
While Africa was the focus of colonial activity in the late nineteenth century, China had
become one of the most important colonial markets, to which all of the powers, including the
United States, wanted access. Shortly after the American conquest of the Philippines, itself
partially justified by expanding trading opportunities in China, the Boxer Rebellion against
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foreign and Christian influences broke out in Northeastern China.49 Historians have explained
this rebellion as a rejection of the missionary activities of Western citizens and their commercial
colonizing project. But the Boxer Rebellion also represents one of the first instances of the
United States acting in concert with other colonial powers in pursuit of mutual commercial
interests. Shortly after the insurrection against the Western powers erupted in China, a force was
organized under the leadership of British Vice Admiral Sir Edward Seymour in which AustriaHungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, and the United States participated.50
This international force was able to work together despite internal rivalries because all of
the powers had a shared interest in suppressing the rebellion and increasing their influence in
China.51 This mission to quell the Boxer Rebellion not only highlights the international character
of colonialism at the time. Their use of actions that the powers knew would alienate the local
population were justified in part by the need to advance “civilization” in the region, a clear
reference to the civilizing missions that legitimated colonialism elsewhere, shows the
convergence of international colonialism around the concept of civilizing missions.52 The
participation of the United States in this was a novel development, given that the Americans had
refused British offers to participate in the Opium Wars, as well as their reluctance to set up a
colony in China along the model of Hong Kong or Macau.53 Although there was a convergence
of American and European imperial practices, the Americans retained a certain distinctiveness
even after this episode by declining its share of the reparations money that the Chinese
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government had been forced to pay to the Western powers following its defeat and repurposing it
into an educational trust for the Chinese.54
Following the Boxer rebellion, the U.S. was integrated into European colonial networks
and open-door policies were implemented in China, for both commercial and missionary
ventures. This facilitated the expansion of American interests in China without committing the
American government to administering any territory.55 Here one can see the relationship between
American policies in China and Latin America. In both cases, the United States insisted upon
open economic access to the region on the basis of that its commerce would have a civilizing
influence, as well as the willingness of the American government to resort to force should it feel
that open-door was compromised. The precedents for American economic policies towards the
mandates system were set: an open-door economic framework whereby all nations would have
equal access to the resources and markets of the territories in question.
Following the Boxer Rebellion, the United States assumed a growing role in international
colonial affairs, including participating in colonial conferences, most notably the Algeciras
Conference of 1906. Convened in response to a Franco-German dispute over the alleged
violation of some German rights by the French in Morocco, the U.S. called for an international
conference to resolve the so-called Moroccan Crisis.56 Although American interests in Morocco
were limited, the United States played an important role in convening the Algeciras Conference
and in formulating some of its key provisions including open-door economic policies.57 Another
decision was to create a central bank for Morocco controlled by Europeans and governed under
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French law, a clear neocolonial policy intended to both foster economic development in the area
while undermining the authority of the Sultan. The Algeciras Conference also established
various forms of international oversight over aspects of the Moroccan state including inspections
of the Moroccan police by the Swiss Army.58 Practices that undermined the authority of the
Sultan while retaining his position as the titular sovereign are reminiscent of policies of indirect
rule adopted by the British and Americans in some parts of their respective empires, this is
notable as an internationalization of Anglo-American colonial principles, which in this case can
be largely attributed to the nature of the Moroccan crisis being a Franco-German dispute in
which the British and Americans played mediating roles. These provisions that facilitated
European oversight of major sections of the Moroccan state seem to have been intended at least
in part to promote a sort of civilizing mission within Morocco, although there are no references
to the civilizing mission in the General Act of the conference, presumably because the Moroccan
Sultan, who convened the conference, would have taken offence to such an inclusion.59 The
economic policies adopted at the Algeciras Conference also reflect a conviction on the part of the
British and American delegations that by guaranteeing international rights in the colonial sphere,
the potential for conflict between the colonial powers could be reduced.60
The imposition of international oversight over Morocco was a response to Belgian
control over the Congo Free State. Despite provisions of the 1885 Berlin Conference, Belgian
authorities blocked international access and committed atrocities against the indigenous
population. Many Americans played a key role in publicizing Belgian atrocities in the Congo,
starting in 1890 with a report by George Washington Williams, leading to a treaty between the
U.S. and the Congolese authorities barring slavery and limiting traffic in liquor and arms,
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provisions that were also included into the mandates.61 The idea at Algeciras was that the French
and Spanish authorities would serve as the “mandatories” of the other powers in Morocco,
maintaining order and preserving their commercial rights in the region, a concept that Quincy
Wright attributed to President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State Elihu Root.62 While this early
iteration of the mandate lacked the formalities associated with the postwar mandates system, one
can see here the development of the basic concept under American auspices of a power assuming
a mandate to ensure the continued commercial access of the other colonial powers to an area, as
well as promoting the advancement of “civilization” within the area while maintaining order. It
is also notable that this was done in a region which, unlike the Congo, had an indigenous
government in place and was thus already beginning to conform to the American conception of
colonialism in which the colonial power undertook administrative duties to prepare the region for
eventual independence. The American presence at the Algeciras Conference produced a regime
that was both more international in nature as well as more aligned with American conceptions of
colonialism and the civilizing mission. The impact of the precedents set at Algeciras were to find
expression in the construction of the mandates system at the Paris Peace Conference.
The nature of colonialism changed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
towards a more internationalized institution. This process occurred in conjunction with an
increase in American involvement in colonial matters, both in terms of the creation of its own
overseas empire and in its involvement in international colonial matters. During this period,
international colonialism came to be justified principally in terms of the civilizing mission
undertaken by European nations, and the United States. While the civilizing mission provided
the theoretical justification for colonialism, it was the economic exploitation of the regions
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concerned that provided a fiduciary incentive for undertaking these civilizing missions. For all
the similarities and cooperation that existed among the colonial powers, there were some
differences in their civilizing missions, the most important of which was that the United States
conceived of their imperial role as preparing peoples for eventual self-government.

Wartime Discussions
Although the First World War primarily took place in Europe, the war also spread to
colonial theatres like the German Pacific islands, much of the Ottoman Middle East, and German
East Africa, in which a force of Germans and Askaris fought until the end of the war.63 Having
conquered most German colonies by the middle of the war, the Allied Powers began to discuss
how they would dispose of them. In the Middle East the military campaigns were less decisive
than in Africa and the Pacific, but the Allied Powers nonetheless felt confident enough to draft
agreements amongst themselves regarding the future disposition of these territories. While the
Allied agreements in the Middle East were the most detailed, it was clear even as late as the Paris
Peace Conference that Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa all wanted to annex the
German colonies they had conquered during the war.64
France held similarly annexationist views on the areas it had conquered in West Africa,
having concluded agreements with the British regarding their postwar status in late August
1914.65 Prior to 1918, neither the British nor the French made any indication that they intended
to substantially alter their colonial practices in Africa, as both planned to expand their empires
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there through the annexation of German colonies.66 There are few indications that the Belgians
held a different view from the British and French in this regard, and the Italians were the most
anxious for expansion following the conclusion of the 1915 Treaty of London. These promises,
however, were made in the vague language of spheres of influence which neither explicitly
promised nor precluded the annexation of territory.67 Italy was perhaps the great power most
anxious to gain territory as a result of the First World War, setting its sights on parts of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, in addition to its colonial claims, including formerly German and
Ottoman territories, as well as British and French territories in the area of the Horn of Africa.68
Japan managed to secure British agreement in early 1917 to its claims to the German concessions
in China as well as the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator.69 While the
agreements regarding Africa and the Pacific were relatively vague, the inter-Allied arrangements
regarding the Middle East were much more detailed, and included the Russians, whose share of
the Middle East was set to include the areas nearest to their border in the Caucasus, as well as the
city of Constantinople.70
The Sykes-Picot agreement of January 1916 divided the Middle East into British and
French territories, as well as an attendant sphere of influence adjacent to this territory. Palestine
was set to be placed under an international administration, save for some territory allotted to
Britain near the port of Haifa. The Sykes-Picot Agreement also mentioned the establishment of
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an independent Arab state (or confederation thereof).71 However, the agreement also provided
that Britain and France would be able to establish direct control over some areas in the Arab
Middle East. Despite guarantees of Arab autonomy, the peace envisioned in this treaty remained
largely annexationist, and certainly did not include internationalized provisions like those that
would become the mandates system.
At the Paris Peace Conference, the European and Dominion governments generally, and
especially those of France and the British Dominions, expected that their conquest of German
and Ottoman territories would result in a conventional division of spoils and the extension of
their sovereignty over these new areas.72 But the principle of annexation of territory as spoils of
war came to be became unacceptable as a result of the Paris Peace Conference. The European
governments did not suddenly undergo a change of heart in late 1917 or 1918 of their own
volition, and their continued attempts during the conference to achieve a status for these
territories as close to annexation as possible indicates that they continued to hope for annexation.
Two events in 1917 changed the course of colonial thinking during the First World War:
the Russian revolution and the American entry into the war. The Russian Revolution necessitated
recalculations on the part of the European powers, not least of which was a consideration of how
the colonial world might respond to this ideological challenge to European hegemony. The
principal challenge posed by the Russian revolution in the colonial sphere was the so-called
“Decree on Peace” issued just a day after the October Revolution, in which Lenin called for a
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peace without annexations and on the basis of self-determination, as well as the end of secret
diplomacy.73 This declaration was coupled with the publication by the Bolsheviks of all the
secret treaties they had found in the Russian government archives, including the Sykes-Picot
Agreement.74 The Russian communist stance on empires and annexations challenged the colonial
ideologies of the Allies and undermined the peace terms they hoped to impose on the Central
Powers.
President Wilson had won the 1916 election on a relatively slim margin and had
campaigned on keeping the United States out of the war, and before the U.S. ultimately entered
the war, he had made pronouncements regarding the idea that the war must end in a “peace
without victory”.75 Wilson ended up pushing for a declaration of war following the German
sinking of the Lusitania and the infamous Zimmerman telegram, leading the United States to
have a much greater say in the peace settlement. Among the most important policy
pronouncements during the war was Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech, which offered an
alternative interpretation of the key concept of self-determination advocated by Vladimir Lenin.
Some have argued that Woodrow Wilson’s iconic Fourteen Points speech on January 8th, 1918
was made in part as a rebuttal to Lenin’s pronouncement.76 While Wilson’s statements on the
subject of self-determination in this speech were rather vague, the Allied governments vastly
preferred any interpretation of this doctrine that was championed by the United States instead of
the Bolsheviks, even if they resented the American interference with their previous agreements.
By the beginning of 1918 the need had arisen among the Allies to offer a vision of the
postwar settlement that would be acceptable to both the European powers and to colonized
peoples around the world agitating for independence. This challenge obliged the Europeans to
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take more seriously the threat of nationalism and the concept of self-determination within their
own empires and the territories they had been planning to annex after the war, a challenge that
was met principally by the policy statements of the United States.
In early 1918, Allied policies and pronouncements regarding the nature of the peace
began to shift. The Europeans believed that they must take Wilson’s ideas about the postwar
settlement more seriously since they had become more dependent on American military and
financial assistance to their war effort.77 On January 5, 1918, British Prime Minister Lloyd
George publicly announced that Britain intended to support the establishment of an international
organization to resolve disputes, echoing Wilson’s call for a League of Nations after the war.78
the French also altered their policies fearing American opposition if they appeared to be too
annexationist with regard to German colonies.79 Despite these shifts in Allied planning towards
positions more in line with those of the United States, the British and French remained
committed to the idea that Germany should be deprived of its colonies at the end of the war. The
loss would weaken the country militarily, as well as serving British and French colonial interests
by consolidating the French Empire in Africa and helping to secure British positions in India and
Southern Africa.80 Here one can see the contradictions present in the partial Americanization of
Allied policy, as they were willing to accept the Wilsonian concept of self-determination as
applicable in Eastern Europe, but remained hesitant to extend this concept to colonial peoples.81
The result of these concessions was that by mid-1918 the European Allies had accepted that
Wilsonian ideas would apply to Europe, though not without contest and compromise.
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The conception of the peace settlement looked different in 1918 from 1916. The entry of
the United States and the collapse of Russia had fundamentally changed the geopolitical
calculations in Europe and had opened a new field of ideological confrontation that was to last
for most of the twentieth century. Despite these momentous shifts, the projected colonial
settlements remained largely unchanged from 1914-1915, save for the acceptance that Russia
would not receive a share in the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The issue confronting the
leaders of Britain and France, and to a lesser extent Italy, was that they had publicly accepted
Woodrow Wilson’s almost messianic promises of self-determination, no annexations, and a
peace without victory, all while planning to annex large swaths of territory from the German and
Ottoman empires. Within the French government and populace there existed an anti-imperialist
faction composed mainly of Socialists and connected with anti-imperialists in Britain, but the
majority of the French government and people demanded annexations in both the Middle East
and Africa.82
Within the British Empire the situation was more nuanced, mainly because the British
government had to contend with the greatly strengthened dominions. The southern dominions of
South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand were all major advocates of an annexationist policy
because they stood to gain territory legally which they had already been administering for some
years under military occupations.83 The Canadian delegation was opposed to the idea of
annexations as they had little to gain and feared that such a policy could upset the Americans.84
This division within the British Empire delegation to the Paris Peace Conference was a source of
considerable difficulties in resolving colonial issues, especially since British Prime Minister
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Lloyd George had invited Dominion representatives into his Imperial War Cabinet, giving them
a much greater say in decision-making than had previously been the case.85
Thus, the colonial question remained an outstanding issue in 1918 even after the
European Allies had accepted most of Wilson’s ideas about the coming peace settlement.
Moreover, the Germans had negotiated the armistice on the understanding that Wilson’s
Fourteen Points would be the basis of any future peace agreement.86 The problem at this stage
was the vagueness of these points, the subjectivity of their interpretation, and the basic
unwillingness to some of the European Allies to adhere to the spirit, if not the letter, of the
points. This uncertainty led to range of proposals on how to deal with areas that had been
removed from the control of the defeated empires, most notably a book published by the
Anglophile South African General, Jan Smuts, on December 16th, 1918 entitled The League of
Nations: A Practical Suggestion.87 In this book Smuts suggested that the League of Nations,
should act as a trustee, or mandatary in Smuts’ preferred terminology, over the territories
separated from the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires.88 Smuts excludes the
German colonies from his suggestions on the grounds that these areas “are inhabited by
barbarians, who not only cannot possibly govern themselves, but to whom it would be
impracticable to apply any ideas of political self-determination in the European sense.”89 He
further stated that these areas should be disposed of according to the fifth of Wilson’s Fourteen
Points, which concerned the adjustment of all colonial claims based on the principle that
indigenous populations should have equal weight with the government whose title was being
determined, but noted that these areas are a “special case” and advocated for their annexation and
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held that the point concerning self-determination ought not to apply to these areas.90 Smuts’
proposals show the syncretism of Wilsonian ideology and British imperialism that came to
define the approach of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, wherein they sought
to annex some of the colonial territories of the defeated Central Powers while paying lip service
to concepts of self-determination.
Smuts’ proposal laid the foundations for the mandates system in important ways,
including its justification on the grounds that the populations of some areas were not yet capable
of governing themselves, and so would require “the guiding hand of some external authority to
steady their administration.”91 Other important suggestions include the idea that the mandatory
state’s position would be that of a “great trust” and that it should not be used for the private
advantage of the mandatory state or its citizens.92 Smuts also suggested the right of appeal to the
League on the part of the indigenous populations against the mandatory state, and that the
League would have the right to remove the mandatory from its position as well as to lay down
the terms of the mandate.93 While there were a number of modifications made to Smuts’ proposal
before and during the Paris Peace Conference, most importantly the shift in its application from
primarily European to colonial areas, this proposal has been correctly understood as the first step
in the development of the mandates system.94 Smuts’ proposal reflects numerous concepts
derived from earlier colonial ideologies, including his attitude towards the “barbarian” peoples of
the German colonies, which reflects widespread racist attitudes of Europeans towards Africans
and other peoples since at least the nineteenth century. His emphasis on the role of government
in the progress of civilization is clearly derived from British and American conceptions of the
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civilizing mission, and the emphasis he places, on the importance of developing self-governing
institutions among the peoples for whom he devised this system is a clear reflection of American,
and particularly Wilsonian, colonial ideologies.
Smuts’ proposal informed pre-conference deliberations on the future of German and
Ottoman colonies. The discussion of colonies was the first major question addressed by the Paris
Peace Conference.95 Smuts’ proposals include aspects of both British and American colonial
ideology, demonstrating the adoption of American colonial ideas, most prominently the role of
self-government and self-determination within the civilizing mission. While the European Allies
may have been less than enthusiastic about the prospect of having their administrations curtailed
by outside interference or external oversight and accountability, they believed that they had to
accept some degree of limitation in order to retain American economic and military support, as
well as to defend themselves ideologically against the Bolsheviks. It is from this vantage that we
must understand the colonial question, and the formulation of the mandates system at the Paris
Peace Conference and beyond.
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Chapter 2: The Design and Meaning of the Mandates System
The proposal by South African statesman Jan Smuts at the end of 1918 laid the
foundations for European and American thinking about the solution to Eastern European and
colonial questions at the Paris Peace Conference. However, there were a number of other
important proposals and preparations made by the various delegations to the Paris Peace
Conference. Many of the plans for the postwar world were drafted by teams of experts assembled
during and after the war by the key powers to prepare suggestions for some of the most complex
issues addressed at the peace conference. In many cases these teams were rather nebulous in
nature. The British delegation had to contend with numerous factions within its own ranks,
including the Imperial government in London and the Dominions, as well as the India Office, the
Foreign Office, and the Colonial Office. While Prime Minister Lloyd George had managed
during the war to centralize most foreign policy decisions within his office, it proved impossible
to hide the divisions within the British Empire delegation once the conference began.96 These
divisions were especially pronounced on colonial questions, most prominently between the
annexationist Southern Dominions of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa and the Imperial
government in London alongside the Canadians under Prime Minister Robert Borden, who took
a more conciliatory approach to President Wilson’s mandates proposal.97
The colonial question was implicated in the changing dynamics in imperial governance
between Britain and the dominions. The British government was torn between placating the
Americans in their drive for more international oversight and control, and the Dominion
governments who wanted to annex new territories.98 The ambivalent attitude of the Southern
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Dominions towards the growth of American power can perhaps be summed up in New Zealand
Prime Minister William F. Massey’s comment at the Imperial Conference of 1921 that the mixed
“races”, which he describes not only in terms of white and black but also in terms of Northern
and Southern Europeans, of the United States were going to produce unpredictable results for the
nation’s future policies.99 Massey was at the head of the New Zealand delegation to the Paris
Peace Conference, and like his Australian counterpart, Prime Minister William H. Hughes,
would prove to be one of the biggest opponents of the mandates system within the British
Empire delegation.100
One of the factors affecting the unity of the British Empire delegation was that New
Zealand and Australia connected the issues of annexation with their desire to be represented as
equals of the other nations at the Paris Peace Conference.101 This issue manifested itself in a
number of ways, with the firm opposition of Australia and New Zealand both to the idea of the
mandate system, and their reluctance to offer any part of the Pacific islands they had conquered
during the war to the United States.102 The British Government, Borden, and Smuts were much
less hostile to the idea of the Americans taking responsibility for one of the colonies detached
from Germany; while Smuts was opposed to the idea of the Americans taking over South-West
Africa, he and the British Government hoped that the United States might agree to take on
German East Africa as a mandate.103 Conversely, there were some within the British government
who hoped that the former German East Africa could be opened to Indian enterprise and
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immigration since the White Dominions had been restricting immigration from India. It was
hoped that by doing so they could placate some of the dissatisfaction in India with its having
contributed to the war effort but having received comparatively little in return.104 The divisions
within the British delegation on the colonial issue were a significant factor in the creation of the
different classes of mandates, which will be discussed in greater detail later. The combined
opposition of the southern dominions helped to create the class C mandates in the Pacific and
South West Africa, as well as pushing the conference to be more accepting of French demands in
the colonial sphere.
The French delegation to the Paris Peace Conference capitalized on their position as the
host of the conference by using the opportunity to take foreign representatives, particularly
President Wilson, to the sites of some of the great battles of the First World War. The point was
to impress upon them the need to be strict with Germany in order to prevent a another war.105
French President Clemenceau adopted the attitude that France had suffered the most from the
war in most aspects of the negotiations, and he stressed the need for France to be prepared for
another war against Germany, which proved to be a major factor in the deliberations over
France’s rights within its mandated territories in West Africa.106 While the French delegation as
a whole, and Foreign Minister Poincaré in particular, were advocates for the acquisition of
German colonies in Africa, and of territories and concessions in the Middle East, Clemenceau
did not view these as major priorities.107 Despite Clemenceau’s view that the colonial question
was not a major priority for France, the perception of many in France’s powerful colonial lobby
was that the mandates system was an Anglo-American construct designed at France’s expense,
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with many feeling that they had earned those colonies through their exertions on the Western
Front.108 While the major French territorial claims were in Africa, there were also French claims
in Lebanon and Syria that predated the First World War.109 France had positioned itself to
receive a share of the territorial spoils should the Ottoman Empire collapse. They strengthened
their claims through the construction of railroads and educational institutions, and through the
creation of extensive contacts with local Christian populations in the area.110 The French position
regarding the colonies must be understood as having a relatively low priority, but one with
tremendous psychological importance to many in the government and general public, who felt
that French national honour was on the line. The impact of this view is highlighted by an incident
in which Clemenceau apparently offered to duel with Lloyd George over the question of oil
rights and troop withdrawals in Syria and Iraq.111 This was combined with the sentiment that the
mandates system, and the proposed peace more generally, was an Anglo-American invention
which left France sidelined and vulnerable. These pressures combined to create a cynical attitude
within the French delegation, which sought not only to ensure that French interests were
protected in the former German and Ottoman Empires, but also sought to undermine the
mandates system, particularly in Africa, to avoid having their colonial empire limited by AngloAmerican oversight and interference.
Beyond the colonial question the French delegation to the Paris Peace Conference also
disagreed with the British and Americans on the role of the League of Nations. The French
conceived of the League as a vehicle to keep the peace, whereas the British conceived of it as a
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venue to promote Anglo-American moral leadership in the international sphere.112 These
differing conceptions had a significant impact on the French view of the mandates system as
serving the Anglo-American conception of the League, as well as their national interests, while
doing little to promote French security concerns in Europe. Ultimately, a compromise was
reached whereby the French would be allowed to recruit troops in their mandated territories in
West Africa for use elsewhere, something that was strictly forbidden for any other mandates. The
phrasing of this compromise, however, reflects Clemenceau’s primary concerns about the ability
of France to defend itself in the event of another major European war. As Article 3 of the French
Mandate for Cameroons stated: “The Mandatory shall not establish in the territory any military
or naval bases, nor erect any fortifications, nor organize any indigenous military force except for
local police purposes and for the defence of the territory. It is understood, however, that the
troops thus raised may, in the event of a general war, be utilized to repel an attack for the defence
of the territory outside that subject to the mandate.”113 Article 2 of the same Mandate confirmed
French suspicions that the mandates system was an Anglo-American institution, as it stated that
“The Mandatory shall be responsible for the peace, order and good government of the
territory…”.114 This phrasing exactly mirrored that employed in the British North America Act,
and showed that the mandates system was indeed grounded in Anglo-American colonial
thinking, much to the chagrin of the French, whose own colonial methodologies would have to
be modified to fit into this new framework.115 On the whole, the French delegation was faced
with an impossible task in attempting to make the colonial gains demanded by many of its
citizens and officials, all while attempting to include protections against another European
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conflict into the peace agreement, as well as trying to maintain good relations with the British
and Americans, who, in French perceptions, were attempting to use the peace to establish
themselves as the new moral leaders of the world.
When Wilson set sail aboard the George Washington for France, accompanied by most of
the American delegation, as well as the team of experts known as The Inquiry, on December 4,
1918 he was lauded as the harbinger of a new world, one in which the concepts of selfdetermination, no annexations, and a peace without victory would prevail.116 At the head of The
Inquiry was Colonel Edward M. House, a close personal friend and confidant of President
Wilson, who had arrived in Europe during the war as Wilson’s chief representative to the Allied
powers.117 House was not a U.S. Army colonel, but rather had been granted the title honorarily in
his home state of Texas, and was, like most of Wilson’s delegation, a Southern Democrat, an
imbalance that was to cost Wilson and his peace plans a great deal when the issue of the U.S.
Senate ratifying the agreements which had been reached in Europe arose.118 The delegation also
included individuals such as Henry White, who was, in addition to being the only Republican
among the senior ranks of the American delegation, an experienced diplomat with a firm
understanding of international colonialism, as he had been one of the chief American negotiators
and signatories to the Algeciras Conference of 1906.119 The partisan nature of the American
delegation was even noted by British Prime Minister Lloyd George and diplomat Harold
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Nicholson, who were concerned from the very beginning about the capacity of this delegation to
negotiate a treaty that would be accepted by the American Senate.120
Another key member of the American delegation was Secretary of State Robert Lansing,
who, despite his close association with President Wilson, had some doubts about the
practicability of Wilson’s idealistic proposals for the solution of the world’s problems.121
Concerns even arose during the conference that Lansing would be sent home because of the
differences between himself and the President. However, both he and President Wilson felt that
this would be embarrassing and might give the Senate further grounds to oppose Wilson’s
plans.122 Despite Lansing’s presence, Wilson exercised almost complete control of American
foreign policy, much to the chagrin of other members of the policy-making establishment.123 The
American delegation was thus neither particularly representative nor united at the Paris Peace
Conference, and despite the enormous influence of Wilson’s ideology the differences of opinion
between him and the rest of his delegation plagued the American peacemaking effort.
The United States entered the Paris Peace Conference with a set of strong principles
concerning the disposal of the colonial territories of the Central Powers, though with few
practical plans as to their application. It was on board the George Washington en route to Paris
that Wilson informed members of The Inquiry about American policies, and it was around this
time that Wilson heard from House that the British and French were reaching private agreements
on definite plans for the conference, leading Wilson to threaten to make separate peace
agreements with the Central Powers.124 This extreme reaction did not come to pass, but it reflects
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something of the American, and Wilsonian, attitude towards the peace conference. Wilson had
come to Europe certain that his new brand of diplomacy, in which self-determination and no
annexations formed the bedrock, would bring them independence and a lasting peace.125
There was much support in Europe and colonial areas for Wilson’s 14 points and
conception of international affairs. However, Wilson’s understanding of Wilsonism and other
peoples’ understanding of Wilsonism were often at odds, starting with the idea of selfdetermination. Wilson had not meant national self-determination in the sense of the right of each
ethnicity to its own independent state, but rather in the Anglo-American sense of civic
nationalism rooted in a common commitment among members of the nation to shared ideals and
democratic self-government.126 This must be understood as being rooted in Wilson’s own
experience of American civic nationalism. As New Zealand Prime Minister Massey had
scornfully pointed out, the United States was composed of many different “races” or
nationalities, and its effective democratic governance was premised on the notion that
heterogenous groups like this could cooperate to form a functional polity on the basis of
democracy and self-government, without the need for a unified ethnic nationalism.127 This
concept of self-determination can be traced back to Wilson’s experience of the multi-ethnic and
multilingual United States, and reflects his general view that American principles could be
universalized and would solve the issues of European nationalism and imperial rivalries.128 Selfdetermination as a civic principle also emerged from Wilson’s understanding of the history of the
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United States and its role in the Philippines.129 Wilson, like many of his contemporaries, believed
that self-government could only be achieved through a slow process of development grounded in
the creation of a sense of civic identity and the rule of law that could be developed over many
generations, and that this process of development was directly linked to the character of the
nation working towards the development of self-government.130 In this one can see the role of
race and the notion of the civilizing mission as being fundamental to understanding Wilson’s
concept of self-determination, that the degree of preparedness for self-government justified the
different classes of mandate and their differences in provisions for self-government. This same
logic was used to distinguish between the resolution of the colonial and Eastern European
settlements. Linked by the importance of self-determination as a guiding principle, these two
areas received very different treatments by the peace conference with the creation of independent
states in Eastern Europe, and the creation of mandates in the colonial world, this difference
threatened to undermine colonized peoples’ confidence in the Allied commitment to the idea of
self-determination as anything more than an ideological slogan.
The British, French, and American delegations were the key makers of the peace
agreement in general, and of the mandates system specifically. The Italian delegation played an
important role early on in the conference, with Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Wilson, and Italian
Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando constituting the “Big Four” who tended to isolate themselves
from the larger conference to make important decisions.131 This group became formalized as the
Council of Four in late March of 1919 in order to streamline negotiations, though rumours
abounded that this creation was also intended to sideline Italian Foreign Minister Sidney
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Sonnino, who had provoked the ire of the Big Four, including Orlando himself.132 Orlando was
always the odd one out in this group; the only one who did not speak English well, he was
preoccupied with Italy’s territorial claims in Europe and thus took little part in other important
negotiations.133 (Clemenceau used a translator throughout the conference, but he spoke English
fluently as a result of having fought for the Union during the American Civil War.134) The Italian
delegation was ambitious in its desire to gain control of formerly Austro-Hungarian areas to their
east, and although the principle of self-determination was violated on the grounds of defense in
granting Italy the Brenner Pass as a frontier, Wilson was unwilling to support their claims in
other areas such as Fiume, a position he explained to Le Temps on April 23, 1919, leading
Orlando and the Italian delegation to walk out of the conference.135 While the Italians returned to
the conference with a new delegation later in the year, this left them largely unrepresented in
discussions beyond the basic premises of the Versailles Treaty, the League, and the mandates
system. The Italians thus gained none of the mandates and ended up with little of the territory or
influenced promised to it in the 1915 Treaty of London and the 1917 Agreement of St.-Jean-deMaurienne.136
Japan was a novel inclusion at the Paris Peace Conference, and although it did end up
with a share of the mandates in the North Pacific, it was represented only on the Council of Five
where the foreign ministers discussed matters passed down to them from the Council of Four.137
The chief Japanese concerns going into the peace conference were the acquisition of German
territories in the Pacific north of the equator, and the acquisition of the former German
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concessions in China.138 These ambitions had been supported by the British since at least
February 1917, when they had sought to leverage this support for naval assistance from Japan.139
The Japanese also attempted to insert a racial equality clause into the language of the Covenant
of the League of Nations, which some have understood as a bargaining chip intended to help
secure Japanese control over the former German concessions in Shandong.140 Others have
interpreted this proposal as a more sincere move by Japan, to reduce the discrimination faced by
Japanese people in places such as the United States and the British Dominions, as well as to
undermine the theory of white supremacy underlying much of European imperialism.141 The
racial equality clause was defeated by the combined weight of the British, French, and American
delegations, a rare instance of agreement between President Wilson and Australian Prime
Minister Hughes.142 The failure of this clause, combined with the Japanese threat to walk out of
the conference if their demands were not met, led Wilson to be concerned that his plans for the
eastern hemisphere as a whole would be in jeopardy. As a result the conference was far from
insistent on enforcing Wilsonian principles regarding the former German concessions in
China.143 This issue is indicative of the approach of the key delegations to the conference
regarding colonialism. Though Wilson wished to modify the international colonial system, he did
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not wish to undermine it; his advocacy for open-door policies and self-determination ended
where concerns over racial demography and influence began, and his conception of the hierarchy
of races, with Anglo-Saxons firmly at the top, remained a guiding feature of the approach
towards colonialism.144
The remaining European delegations had less interest in the colonial issues at the Paris
Peace Conference, with the Belgians and Portuguese being the only other Allied powers with
major colonial concerns. Belgium had suffered considerable devastation during the war, and
Belgian troops from the Congo had played a role in defeating the Germans in East Africa,
leading them to a claim over some mandated territories in western East Africa, Ruanda and
Urundi.145 Portugal also wished to claim a mandate adjacent to one of its colonies in Africa,
though it was not assigned any. It did receive full sovereignty over a small area on the border
between Mozambique and German East Africa, the Kionga triangle, which it had recognized as
German in a treaty in 1894.146 Kionga is a notable exception to the application of the mandatory
principle in former German colonies, and this was justified on the basis of earlier Portuguese
claims to the territory.147 The cession of Kionga to Portugal in full sovereignty was a clear
violation of the Fourteen Points and the spirit of the mandates system in order to placate a minor
ally, and can be considered as a colonial equivalent to the agreement that Italy should gain
control of South Tyrol in violation of the principle of self-determination. The smaller European
delegations, while unable to secure significant territorial gains for themselves in the colonial
sphere, did manage to gain some notable concessions, including representation on the Permanent
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Mandates Commission, and thus secured for themselves, much as Wilson had earlier desired, a
powerful voice in the colonial affairs of the major powers.148
A small number of delegations arrived from colonial territories, most notably a
delegation to represent the Arabs headed by Emir Faisal, son of Emir Hussein of Mecca, King of
Syria, and later King of Iraq, whose delegation was the only one present in Paris to represent an
area that would be placed under mandate.149 These colonial delegations received very little
attention from the Big Four, and had little impact on the settlement of colonial questions, though
Wilson was much more sympathetic to Faisal’s arguments on the basis of self-determination than
were the British and French who had territorial ambitions in the area.150 While Faisal was largely
unsuccessful in pressing his case for Arab independence, his lobbying efforts for a commission
to travel to the Middle East to ascertain the desires of the locals pursuant to self-determination
were well received by President Wilson.151 This commission was originally designed to be an
international effort but, as Arthur Balfour complained, ended up as a principally American affair,
known as the King-Crane Commission.152 This commission had some particularly American
characteristics, namely that it followed Wilson’s preferred methodology of appointing
commissioners with whom he was personally connected, and that it was based on American
colonial precedents, including President Cleveland’s commission to Hawaii, and the 1899-1900
Philippines Commission.153 The Wilsonian nature of this commission is further revealed by the
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choice of its leaders, Henry Churchill King, the president of Oberlin College and major Christian
education reform advocate, alongside Charles Crane who was an heir to the Crane plumbing
fixtures estate and major campaign donor to Wilson.154 The choice of these two men instead of
career diplomats or Middle East experts reveals Wilson’s preference for a personal brand of
diplomacy, as well as underlining his control over American foreign policy to the detriment of
Congress in general and Republicans in particular.
Wilson hoped that by creating internationalized colonies, in which all League members
would have economic access under the open-door policies, he could promote membership in the
League and help to diffuse imperial rivalries.155 This view is exemplified by Wilson’s statements
to a meeting aboard the George Washington on December 11, 1918 when he explained to
American colonial expert George Louis Beer, that he envisioned the mandated territories as the
“cement for the League of Nations, the common property which would hold it together…”156
Wilson viewed the mandates as an integral part of a lasting peace; through their
internationalization the rivalries of European imperialism could be cooled, and the whole of the
civilized world brought to share equitably in the trade of the colonial sphere.157 This conception
of the mandates within the League held little meaning for the French delegation who viewed the
League primarily as means to avoid another war in Europe, and an unwelcome limitation on their
freedom of action within the colonies they hoped to acquire in Africa.158 The British had similar
concerns about freedom of action within mandated territories. For instance the administrator of
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German East Africa, Horace Byatt, had hoped to deny the return of a group of Swiss
missionaries that he felt were connected with Germany, and the Colonial Office noted that the
provisions of the mandates system regarding the freedom of movement for missionaries were
likely to limit his ability to deny them entry.159 Ultimately it was only the desire on the part of
Britain to retain good relations with the Americans, and of the French to retain good relations
with the British and Americans as insurance for another war against Germany, that led to the
adoption of Wilson’s philosophy regarding the mandates with so few caveats.

The Design of the Mandates System at the Paris Peace Conference
At the Paris Peace Conference the mandates issue was addressed in a nebulous manner,
its general principles and structure being among the first issues to be addressed by the conference
in January. It was largely resolved by January 30, when a resolution proposed by Lloyd George
was accepted that the mandatory principle should be applied to all former German and Turkish
territories.160 Thereafter the mandates question was often shunted to the side for the conference
to deal with matters that were felt to be more pressing, such as the issue of German reparations
for the war.161 The result of these preliminary discussions was Article 22 of the draft League of
Nations Covenant, which was to form the most important legal foundation for the existence of
the mandate system.162 This article enshrined some of the key principles that had been proposed
by both Smuts and Wilson before the conference, most notably the concept of the mandates as
forming “a sacred trust of civilization” and the notion that the role of the mandatory is to act in
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the interests of the inhabitants of the territory and to work towards the development of selfgoverning institutions.163 Another key aspect of this article is the differentiation between three
grades of mandate on the basis of “the stage of the development of the people, the geographical
situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.”164 In this one
can clearly see the influence of not only the civilizing mission as the underlying concept of the
mandates system, but also the assumptions regarding racial hierarchies held by Wilson, Smuts,
and many of their colleagues.
Article 22 divided the colonial territories into three categories corresponding to the racial
hierarchies imagined by the powers, with the Middle Eastern areas of the former Ottoman
Empire forming the highest-ranking group, said to “have reached a stage of development where
their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand
alone.”165 Here one can see clearly the adoption of an American colonial ethos that the ultimate
goal of colonial administration is self-government once they have reached a stage of
development, in European terms, that would allow them to govern themselves effectively. The
justification of tutelage in the Middle East was explicitly on racial grounds, with the British
viewing the Arabs as “compulsively dishonest”, and the connection with American colonial
experience was made explicit by Arthur Hirtzel, an important figure in the India Office,
comparing the Arabs to the “Red Indians” in terms of their capacity for self-government.166
Moreover, the Americans looked favorably upon the idea of European tutelage in the Middle
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East as an inexpensive way to protect their economic interests in the region, an idea which was
furthered by their own experience with interventions in Latin America in order to protect their
economic interests there.167
The next category of mandates were to be found in central Africa, where the mandatories
were to be “responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will
guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and
morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic,
and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of
military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and
will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the
League.”168 Here one can see specific aspects of the colonial civilizing mission integrated into
the language of the covenant, most notably that the maintenance of public order and morals is the
responsibility of the mandatory power, the implication being that such peoples would be
incapable, or unwilling, to undertake these responsibilities themselves. Furthermore, this type of
mandate includes provisions relating to the freedom of commerce within such territories for
members of the League, a provision that satisfied not only Wilson’s conception of the role of the
mandates as an incentive for League membership, but also a reflected American commercial
primacy at the time, which would have enabled them to reap the benefits of colonial control of
these territories without having to bear the burdens of administration.169 This concept of
American economic imperialism through penetration of new markets without administering them
has been traced by some authors as far back as the 1890s, demonstrating that this is an
167
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application of older American foreign policies to changed circumstances, rather than an
innovation in American policy.170
The final category of mandates was to be found mainly in the Pacific, as well as SouthWest Africa, “which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their
remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the
Mandatory, and other circumstances, can best be administered under the laws of the Mandatory
as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of
the indigenous population.”171 Here one can see the willingness of the conference to compromise
some of the principles of the mandates system in order to placate the delegations that had
opposed the system, namely Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Japan, justified by the
racist conceptions of the powers regarding colonized peoples in these areas. This was done by
allowing the imposition of essentially domestic laws to these territories, and the exclusion of
certain key provisions of the system such as the open-door, as well as a much laxer approach to
the eventual independence of the territories. This class of mandate amounted to little more than
annexation subject to oversight by the League of Nations, and the idea of the “sacred trust of
civilisation” as outlined in the first paragraph of Article 22, which was hoped would prevent
abuses against the indigenous inhabitants.172
While the implementation of this category of mandates must be understood in part as a
concession to the Dominions by the conference to gain their acquiescence on other aspects of the
peace settlement and the mandates system more generally, this did not prevent a number of
protests being raised by the United States against the exclusion of their missionaries and trade
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from Pacific islands that were so mandated.173 The Americans also protested their economic
exclusion from some of these territories, though they appear to have felt that the majority of
these mandates were of little importance to them. They were concerned that South Africa now
considered South-West Africa to be united in customs with the Dominion, meaning that they
could legally discriminate against American trade there, and had similar issue with the Australian
treatment of potential oil deposits in New Guinea being reserved for the exploitation of the
mandatory power.174 A key aspect of the agreement to create this class of mandates, which
violated most of the basic ideas behind the mandates system, was the issue of immigration. Both
Australia and New Zealand were concerned at the time with excluding Asian immigrants from
their countries, and this concern extended to the colonies they had captured during the war.175
The question of Japanese immigration was also pressing for the United States, which was
concerned with increasing immigration to the west coast and Hawaii, and worried that the
Japanese proposals for racial equality would limit the ability to restrict immigration on the basis
of race.176 The Americans were also concerned, like the Australians and New Zealanders, that
the Japanese would fortify their new Pacific territories, something that the requirements of the
mandates would, at least theoretically, prevent.177 The combination of these issues, coupled with
the relative lack of American economic interests in what were to become the C mandates,
explains the willingness of the conference to concede so many of the key principles of the
mandates system for these territories.
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The mandate classes and their locations were worked out in January of 1919 and
integrated into the Covenant of the League of Nations, thereby enshrining a Wilsonian
conception of their role as internationalized colonies within the new international legal system.
While this was a momentous step towards solving the so-called “colonial issue” at the Paris
Peace Conference, the problems surrounding the mandates system were far from solved at the
end of January. The major issue remaining was the allocation of the mandates, which was
particularly important to the southern dominions, the French, the Japanese, the Belgians, and to
some within the American delegation. Wilson had initially favored the idea of giving the
mandates to small powers, though he was not specific about what he meant; one can surmise that
he was probably referring to smaller European nations such as Norway or the Netherlands, given
his strong preferences for Northern Europeans.178 This idea was impractical for several reasons.
As Wilson’s expert on Africa G. L. Beer noted, nations with few resources and little colonial
experience could hardly be expected to be more effective than larger empires in colonial
administration.179 This issue was even more concerning given that one of the main arguments for
removing Germany from its colonies was that it had not conducted its civilizing missions
effectively, and had committed abuses against the indigenous inhabitants.180 Even if the record of
a small power were better than Germany’s, which was certainly not the case with Belgium, the
Wilsonian program for mandatory administration required a combination of economic might,
colonial experience, and disinterestedness that small nations had a very hard time meeting. While
the available sources make it difficult to trace exactly when Wilson came to this realization,
members of his and other delegations seem to have realized quickly that the mandates would
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have to be administered by the great powers, an idea that was hardly offensive to the French
delegation and to some parts of the British and American delegations.
Another issue was whether the United States would take on any mandates, and if so,
which ones. The British had made offers to the Americans regarding possible administration of
the former German East Africa in October of 1918, which Colonel House interpreted as a cynical
maneuver to improve Britain’s ability to acquire other territories.181 East Africa was held by
many to be the most valuable of the African colonies made available as result of the war, but
American experts such as G. L. Beer felt that it was too distant from the United States to be
valuable, and preferred the idea of acquiring a mandate in West Africa, especially in
Cameroons.182 Wilson seems to have rejected the idea of the United States accepting any
mandates in Africa or Asia, but was open to the possibility of accepting mandates in the Middle
East, where he expressed particular interest in Armenia and the Turkish Straits area.183 The
British seem to have wanted the Americans to take mandates in this area, possibly because the
United States could serve as a buffer between British and Russian territories. The Americans
would then be responsible for the fate of the Sultan and the Turks, an issue of great sensitivity to
many Muslims living in British territories, particularly in India.184 Wilson knew that many
Americans, and much of the American government, were hesitant to take on military
commitments in Asia and noted that he was unable to commit the United States to assuming any
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mandates until he could return to consult with the U.S. government.185 Clearly the delegation
was aware that the desire to expand the American role in international colonialism was not
shared by all Americans. Wilson’s choice of potential American mandates is also telling, as these
were held to be among the most civilized areas to be mandated; the Americans would not have to
remain long in a mandatory role and could serve as an example of how a mandate could be
guided towards self-government.186
The issue of selecting mandatories would last well beyond the Paris Conference, but it
seems that by May 6th Wilson had come to accept that the mandates would generally be assigned
to those powers that had conquered them during the war. 187 This must be understood essentially
as the recognition of a fait accompli, as the use of military force to dislodge a power such as
Japan or New Zealand from a portion of its conquered territory would be disastrous to the
general international order that Wilson was attempting to construct. Even if technically feasible,
the military forces required would not be forthcoming from any power. This recognition did not
preclude negotiations between the victorious powers; indeed, the British had been in occupation
of Syria since 1918 and this territory ended up being mandated to France. But it meant that
Wilson’s original vision of small powers assuming the mandates was dead, and that the
settlement of this issue was likely to closely resemble the horse-trading of past peace
agreements.188 While this was far from a complete victory for Wilson’s vision for the future of
colonialism, the establishment of the system of mandates at all, and the creation of the different
mandate classes with their particular stipulations, must be understood as being, to a great degree,
the result of American influence. Of particular note in this regard are the acceptance of the idea
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that the ultimate goal of colonialism is the creation of self-governing peoples and states within
the colonized areas, a significant break from French practice, and a modest break from British
precedents, but a clear continuation of American policies in the Philippines since the Roosevelt
administration.189 This can be seen clearly in that it was not on the basis of the consent of the
governed that the mandates were imposed, much as the Philippines had not consented to
American governance, but the idea that civilizing missions culminating in eventual selfgovernment justified imperial rule.190 Another key aspect of the mandates that demonstrates their
Americanized character is the provision of open-door economic and missionary policies in the A
and B class mandates, which not only fit American ideological predilections for free trade, but
also served American business interests in the mandates and aligned nicely with the precedents
the United States had set in Latin America.
While the resolution of the colonial question at the Paris Peace Conference failed to
achieve Wilson’s idealistic goals, it succeeded in enshrining key American principles into the
League of Nations and the international colonial system. The mandates system that resulted from
these principles bears a striking resemblance to the manner in which the United States organized
its territories and colonies at the time: an analogy can be drawn between the relationship the U.S.
government had to its territories in the American west, to the relationship between the League of
Nations and the class A mandates, whereby the League or the federal government exerted an
ever-diminishing level of authority as the state prepared for nationhood or statehood, subject to
the approval of the League of Nations, or of Congress. A similar analogy can be drawn between
the relationship of the League and the B mandates to the American administration of the
Philippines, wherein less authority is vested in the indigenous government, in part because of the
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conception that the inhabitants were inherently less civilized, and thus less prepared for selfgovernment, and because the level of economic development in the territory was such that they
were held to be incapable of negotiating with other nations as equals. The class C mandates then
must be understood by analogy to the Insular Territories of the U.S. government, which were
held to be so small and weak that there was no reasonable prospect for them to achieve selfgovernment in the foreseeable future. They must be protected by a major power lest they fall
victim to the abuses of a larger power not so altruistically inclined as the United States, or as the
mandatory powers under the guidance of the League of Nations.
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Chapter 3: Implementation of the Mandates System
We shall now turn to the implementation of the system after the Paris Peace Conference.
To demonstrate that the system represented an Americanization of international colonialism this
chapter will begin by looking at the withdrawal of the United States from the League of Nations
and the failure of the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. This overview will highlight the
continued influence of Wilsonian ideology, as well as showing how the new American
administrations continued to directly influence the mandates, albeit in a less ideological and
more self-serving manner than at Paris. Thereafter we shall look at the assignment of the
mandates in the early 1920s and the transitions between military occupation and mandatory
regimes, to understand how the mandates complied with both the ideologically Americanized
version of colonialism envisioned by the League Covenant, and with American neocolonial
practices that had been developed before the First World War. This analysis will then move to
the operation of the many safeguards in the mandates system to ensure that the mandated
territories would be administered as a “sacred trust of civilization”. This chapter will then
conclude with a brief case study of Iraq, the only mandate to achieve its independence before the
Second World War, to understand how and why the system facilitated independence here and not
in the other mandates. This analysis will reveal that in addition to the slow internationalization of
colonialism beginning in the nineteenth century and the surge in American ideological influence
that resulted in the creation of the mandates system, even after the isolationist turn of the United
States following Wilson’s death and the non-entry of the United States into the League of
Nations, the mandates system continued to represent American ideology, and continued to be
responsive to American influence through both direct and indirect means.
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From Wilsonism to Self-Interest
The Paris Peace Conference ended in June of 1920 as the League of Nations in Geneva
prepared to become the main centre of international negotiations, with the League Council
holding its first meeting on January 16, 1920.191 The transition from the Paris Peace Conference
to the League of Nations as the main forum for international deliberation was a slow but
purposeful move, though it never fully replaced bilateral and multilateral negotiations between
the powers, especially since the United States never ratified the Treaty of Versailles nor joined
the League. Despite Wilson and the American delegations attempts to formulate the league
covenant and the peace treaties in a way that would be acceptable to the U.S. government as a
whole, they were not able to overcome the resistance of a group of Republican Senators known
as the “Irreconcilables”.192 These staunch opponents of the Covenant were not alone in opposing
Wilson’s agreements, and it would be a mistake to attribute the failure to ratify the Treaty of
Versailles entirely to animosity between the parties. Some Republicans, including former
president William Howard Taft, were enthusiastic supporters of the League of Nations, while
others held reservations, but not as strongly as the Irreconcilables.193 The failure to ratify the
Treaty and join the League was the result of a complex mixture of motives, including issues such
as the “six votes of the British Empire” and concerns that the United States would find itself
entangled in European conflicts.194 Article 22 and the mandates system seem not to have
attracted much attention during the ratification debates in the Senate. However, the issue of a
single colonial area, the Shantung concessions, proved contentious enough that after the Senate
enunciated its reservation in late August, 1919, that the decision to award Shantung to Japan
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should be reversed and the area be awarded to China was enough to spur Wilson into a crosscountry tour in the hopes of convincing the American people to support the treaties he had
negotiated.195
It was during this tour that Wilson’s health failed him, and though he would live until
1924, he was not the man he had been, with many observers noting that he had begun to have
angry outburst and often forgot things.196 With Wilson’s health failing, American foreign policy
had lost a key figure, and although the concept of the League of Nations remained popular with
many Americans, this was not enough to overcome the resistance of the mainly Republican
Senators who were concerned about the implications of the League for American sovereignty
and freedom of action.197 The concerns of these Senators included the protection of the Monroe
Doctrine from outside interference, which helps to show that although Wilson’s foreign policy
had not necessarily represented the American government, his concepts of neocolonialism were
widely held across party lines.198 The League remained a major issue in the Presidential election
of 1920, with the Democratic candidate, former Ohio Governor James M. Cox, campaigning on a
Wilsonian platform, and Republican candidate Warren G. Harding playing coy on the issue so as
not to divide his party.199 The result of the election was an overwhelming Republican victory in
both the popular vote and the electoral college, with the Democrats retaining strong support only
in the South.200 This Republican victory, based in part on appeals against certain aspects of the
League of Nations, represents a major change in American foreign policy, and the separation of
Wilsonian influence, itself grounded in American historical precedent, and direct U.S. influence
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through a now largely self-interested foreign policy. The new American foreign policy did not
shy away from global engagement but held a different view of how the United States ought to
interact with the world, choosing to eschew the broad multilateralism of Wilson and the League
of Nations in favour of a more bilateral approach.
The new American administration continued to assert that it had rights in the mandated
territories even though it had not joined the League, arguing instead that rights in those territories
derived mainly from the right of conquest.201 These rights, they asserted, were derived from
being a major member of the Allied and Associated Powers; as such they had contributed to the
overall victory over Germany and were thereby entitled not only to the same rights in mandated
territories that were granted to all League members, but also to approve specific mandate
assignments and agreements.202 The United States continued to assert that it had the full rights to
which it would have been entitled as a member of the league, even including provisions in
treaties with mandatory powers to be furnished with a copy of the annual report on the mandate
that was to be provided to the Permanent Mandates Commission.203 It is clear that while the
United States was retreating from certain forms of international engagement, it was not
withdrawing from participation in the mandates system, but was merely adopting a more
pragmatic tack in its dealings with the mandates. It continued to insist on retaining all the rights
afforded to League members, grounding this not in Wilsonian multilateralism but in a more
traditional American neocolonial attitude in which economic interests are put before ideological
concerns or considerations of global diplomacy.
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The Allocation of the Mandates
The change in American administration had little impact on the ability to influence events
in the mandates system, most notably the assignment of mandatories. Although the legal bases of
the mandates were to be found in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of
Versailles, the assignment of mandatories remained within the purview of the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers.204 The role of the League in the mandates began once they had been
assigned, meaning that although the League remained a major venue for the discussion of
territories to be mandated, it was ultimately the decision of the Allied and Associated Powers
which country would be assigned a given mandate.205
While the broad outlines of the allocation of mandates had been worked out during the
Paris Peace Conference, there were considerable delays in the formal assignment of mandatories
because of realities on the ground and reservations held by the powers, particularly the United
States. The C mandates were the first be confirmed by the League Council, on December 17,
1920.206 These mandates were assigned along the lines of military conquest during the war, with
South-West Africa being assigned to South Africa, the Pacific islands north of the equator to
Japan, Western Samoa to New Zealand, New Guinea and associated islands to Australia, and
Nauru to the British Empire as whole with Australia acting as the mandatory administrator.207 It
is notable that for all their bluster over the issue of mandates, the Southern Dominions ultimately
received very little in terms of territory or population, with Australia gaining only 392,816
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people according to 1931 estimates, and New Zealand gaining only 46,023 for the same year.208
The role of the United States in the assignment of these mandates was minor, as it had few
concerns in the region. The major exception was the island of Yap in the Caroline Islands, which
was to fall under the Japanese mandate for islands north of the equator.209 The Americans were
concerned about Japanese control over the many undersea cables that passed through Yap,
because these cables were the main means of communication between the United States and its
Pacific possessions such as Guam and the Philippines, as well as with commercially important
posts in areas of the Far East such as China.210 Other nations such as the Netherlands were
concerned about ownership of these cables as well, not only because of the strategic implications
of Japanese control over important communication lines, but also because Dutch shareholders
owned large portions of the German companies that had established these cables.211 It became
clear that the terms agreed upon in Paris for the Japanese mandate could only be understood as
having included Yap, and although the Americans contended that open-door provisions ought to
be applied and thus open Yap to international cable operations, the British government was
unable to support this position.212 Ultimately the issue was resolved through a bilateral treaty
between the United States and Japan, concluded on February 11, 1922, article 3 of which stated
that “The United States and its nationals shall have free access to the Island of Yap on a footing
of entire equality with Japan or any other nation and their respective nationals in all that relates
to the landing and operation of the existing Yap-Guam cable or of any cable which may hereafter
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be laid or operated by the United States or by its nationals connecting with the Island of Yap.”213
The issue of Yap is illustrative of how the United States behaved towards the mandates after the
Paris Peace Conference. It continued to insist upon its rights in mandated territories despite a
lack of membership in the League, and in the use of bilateral treaties to achieve their material
goals in mandated areas rather than working multilaterally through the League of Nations.
For the other Pacific mandates, the United States concluded treaties with the relevant
powers in order to ensure that it was treated equally to members of the League in these
territories, and continued to insist that all annual reports furnished to the League also be provided
to the U.S. government.214 The formal drafting and ratification of the C mandates proceeded
fairly swiftly, and contained a number of provisions that highlight the nature of the mandates
system and the concepts of the civilizing mission, replete with racial assumptions and
hierarchical views of civilizational development, that justified its existence. Take for instance the
mandate for Nauru, a small island most notable at the time for its significant phosphate deposits,
which became the most internationalized of the C mandates as the mandate here was held by the
British Crown on behalf of the British government, Australia, and New Zealand.215 Here there
was little in the way of direct American influence, however the design of the mandates system
imparted a good deal of Wilsonian, and thus American, ideology into the mandate. Article 2
assigns the mandate as “an integral portion of his [the mandatory’s] territory”, but also stipulates
that “The mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the
social progress of the inhabitants…”216 Article 3 of the mandate prohibited the supply of
“intoxicating spirits and beverages to the natives” and article 5 provided that missionaries who
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were citizens of any member state of the League of Nations would have the right to undertake
their activities in Nauru.217 This mandate, like all others, contained provisions that an annual
report be provided to the League reporting on measures taken to carry out the obligations of the
mandatory in accordance with the terms of the mandate.218 While Nauru and the other C
mandates saw little in the way of commitments towards self-government, this followed the
hierarchical logic of civilization enshrined into article 22 of the League covenant. The provisions
of these mandates reflect the perception at the time of what could reasonably be achieved in
these “uncivilized” areas, and the prohibitions on providing alcohol to the indigenous
inhabitants, and on the freedom of movement and proselytization reflect notions of the civilizing
mission and how it ought to be carried out.
One of the issues facing the Pacific mandates was that they had been administered by the
future mandatories for some time prior to their confirmation as mandatories. Most of the Pacific
islands formerly held by Germany had been captured by the end of 1914.219 This meant that the
inhabitants already had a sense of the sort of control that would be imposed on them, and this did
not always leave a positive impression. In Western Samoa, for instance, the New Zealand
administration came to be negatively compared with the American administration in neighboring
American Samoa when in 1918 the American authorities refused to allow a vessel to dock
because some of the passengers were infected with pneumonic influenza, which was spreading as
a global pandemic at the time; it was allowed to dock by the New Zealand authorities, resulting
in the disease killing approximately one-fifth of the territory’s population.220 This event eroded
the confidence of the local population in the New Zealand administration, and when Colonel R.
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W. Tate arrived in early 1919 to become the territory’s new administrator, the population
immediately requested that the islands be handed over to the United States, or to direct British
rule if the Americans proved unwilling to take over administration of the islands.221 This event is
illustrative of how the United States was viewed by colonized peoples at the time, namely as the
most effective administrator and the most likely to put them on a path towards self-government,
as they were doing in the Philippines.
For the B mandates matters were more complicated because the C mandates had already
been assigned when the United States addressed a note to the League Council stating its
objections over Yap and issues in the Mesopotamian oil fields.222 The assignment of the A and B
mandates was postponed as a result of this note (the C mandates, having already been assigned,
were not reopened for discussion).223 In Africa, much like in the Pacific, the assignment of
mandatories largely followed the lines of conquest, with Britain being assigned B mandates over
most of German East Africa, thereafter called Tanganyika, and parts of Togoland and the
Cameroons. France received mandates for the majority of Togoland and the Cameroons, though
the boundary between the mandates held by Britain and France in these areas was not delineated
until 1930.224 Belgium received a mandate for the area of Ruanda-Urundi, today called Rwanda
and Burundi, which were notable for their population density and their “virtual autonomy”.225
While the British and French were represented at all the important meetings concerning
the disposition of colonial territories, smaller nations like Belgium and Portugal were not, much
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to their chagrin. This resulted in the mandates being initially assigned without regard for these
two states, with Belgium in particular hoping to see major adjustments to its colonial frontiers.
Portugal was placated with the small Kionga Triangle being given to them in full sovereignty.226
The Belgians had hoped that their capture of large swaths of German East Africa during the war
might allow them to organize a three-party territorial swap in which they would transfer parts of
East Africa under their control to Britain, Portugal would transfer control over the southern bank
of the Congo river to them, and would then be compensated by Britain with territory in the
southern part of East Africa bordering the Portuguese colony of Mozambique.227 The Belgians
knew that this scheme might not work because of Portuguese recalcitrance, but hoped that if the
plan failed they would be left with a large area of northwestern East Africa. Much to their
dismay, the Belgians learned that not only were the Portuguese unwilling to cooperate in their
territorial swap, but Britain had also been tentatively assigned the mandate for all of German
East Africa at a meeting of the larger powers.228 The Belgians were indignant at this state of
affairs, and eventually worked out an agreement with Britain whereby they would be assigned
the mandate for the districts of Ruanda and Urundi.229 This was not the end of the issues that
would arise regarding the Belgian mandates, however, as George Louis Beer was against the
awarding of the mandate for Ruanda-Urundi to Belgium based on its history of abuses against
indigenous populations in its colonies, which he felt had not been reformed sufficiently.230 This
argument was greatly strengthened by the general position of the Allied and Associated Powers
that their takeover of German colonies was based, at least in part, on the poor treatment of
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indigenous peoples by the German colonial administrations.231 Ultimately Beer’s protests came
to nothing and the assignment of the Belgian mandate proceeded without interruption. But the
Belgians then became embroiled in a different conflict over the category of mandate they were
going to receive, a conflict that was wrapped up in similar debates including the British, French,
and Americans.
The French had been anxious to obtain control over as much of German West Africa as
possible and to incorporate as much of these areas into their already substantial holdings in the
region as their wartime allies would allow. The French had accepted the idea of the mandates
system in the first place to placate the Americans, and hoped that they would be able to obtain
the most generous possible terms for their mandates as a result.232 Understanding that they were
unlikely to gain C mandates on the same terms as those assigned in the Pacific, the French were
hoping to see only slight modifications to these terms for their mandates in West Africa and to
incorporate these areas into their existing West African colonies, and avoid the open-door
economic provisions of the B mandates.233 The British were initially inclined towards the French
position, but realized that Belgian opinion would be inflamed by receiving a less favorable
category of mandate than the French, and understood that American opposition to the granting of
C mandates to France meant that there would be significant issues and delays should they fail to
agree to B mandates for West Africa.234 At this stage it was not uncommon for the League to
bend to American opinion, and the French were ultimately forced to accept B mandates in West
Africa. However, they were able to insert a clause into their mandate agreements that was not
present in the other B mandates, namely that they would be allowed to raise troops in the
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mandated territory for use in other areas.235 This concession satisfied the French desire to extract
manpower from the colonies in the event of another war, while allowing the Americans opendoor economic access to the areas as part of a B rather than a C mandate.
The British were less concerned by the terms of B mandates than were the French and
seem to have been less interested in the Germany’s former colonies in West Africa than they
were in German East Africa. When the boundary agreements between British and French
holdings in West Africa were drawn up in 1929 and 1930 the French received the lion’s share of
the territory and population of these districts.236 In East Africa the British had generally been
willing to see the territory fall into American hands, despite a lack of American enthusiasm about
this option.237 Not all Britons were supportive of giving the Americans control over East Africa.
Smuts was opposed, as were some in the India Office who hoped to see the territory transformed
into a sort of “colony for India.”238 Ultimately the mandate for German East Africa was assigned
to Britain, who renamed the territory to Tanganyika and undertook to administer it under a
normal B mandate.
The most important aspect of the B mandates for the United States was the inclusion of
open-door economic provisions, which allowed American corporations to operate in mandated
territories on the same footing as those of the mandatory. These provisions, alongside those
ensuring the freedom of movement for nationals of League members, were enshrined, for
instance, in Article 6 of the British mandates for the Cameroons, Togoland and East Africa,
which stipulated that “the Mandatory shall ensure to all nationals of States Members of the
League of Nations on the same footing to his own nationals, freedom of transit and navigation,
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and complete economic, commercial and industrial equality…”.239 This article further stated that
general monopolies were not to be granted by the mandatory, and that concessions for the
development of national resources “shall be granted without distinction on grounds of nationality
between nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations…”240 Besides economic
provisions, the B mandates ensured freedom of access for missionaries to mandated territories,
and provided in several articles for the well-being of the indigenous inhabitants of these
territories to form a central consideration of the mandatory regimes.241 What is absent from the B
mandates is any meaningful provisions for self-government of the indigenous inhabitants, this
being justified by the racial and civilizational logic of Article 22 of the League covenant.
Notably, comments were made regarding the Belgian mandated territories concerning their
relative autonomy and population density, with George Louis Beer going so far as to suggest that
these areas should “governed by means of native institutions.”242 This is not to say that he was
suggesting they become wholly independent states, but rather he seems to have been suggesting
something more akin to an A class mandate or a protectorate like the Princely States of India,
rather than a B mandate. The reason Ruanda and Urundi ended up as B mandates lay more in
negotiations between the Europeans than in the realities on the ground; the racial basis for
assigning most of the German colonies in Africa as B mandates had already been accepted, and
the Belgians were concerned that they would receive a less favorable class of mandate than the
French.243 What one sees here is the failure of American idealism to overcome the political
necessities of European realpolitik, and that by attaching the fate of the former German colonial
empire to the legitimacy of the postwar peace agreements and the League of Nations,
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compromises had to be made to fundamental principles in order to gain the acquiescence of
European states to the postwar order. The compromises of the B mandates are emblematic of
Wilson’s and the United States’ operating method. They were idealistic in their approach, but
were more concerned with securing larger goals, such as ensuring that the League of Nations and
the peace agreements were perceived as legitimate, and in securing American material interests
in colonial areas.
Ultimately the B mandates were approved in July 1922, with the British and French
mandates in West Africa being approved on July 18th, and the mandates for Tanganyika and
Ruanda-Urundi on July 20th.244 Treaties between the B mandatories and the United States
confirming the rights of American nationals equivalent to those of League members in the
mandated territories were concluded shortly after the mandates were confirmed. Conventions
between the U.S. and France were signed in Paris on February 13, 1923; a treaty with the
Belgians was signed in Brussels on April 18, 1923, and treaties concerning the British-mandated
territories in Africa were signed on February 10, 1925.245 The main American features of the B
mandates, besides the open-door economic provisions and missionary access, were more in what
was prevented than what was achieved. The B mandates diverged from existing colonialism in
Africa not in terms of self-government, but in terms of the legal framework that was established
by the mandates system, which enshrined the interests of the indigenous inhabitants as
fundamentally important and established a mechanism of enforcement that would allow the
inhabitants of these territories, or outsiders on their behalf, to petition the international
community if they felt that their rights were being violated by the mandatory, and empowered
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the League, at least theoretically, to rebuke or sanction a mandatory for such violations.246
Furthermore, the prohibitions on constructing fortifications or recruiting troops for use outside of
the mandated areas, with the exception of the permission given to France to recruit indigenous
troops, were clearly enacted in order to disincentivize the maintenance of colonialism in these
areas by removing any military advantage from holding them. It seems likely that this was done
in part in the hopes that the mandatory governments would see it as in their interests to promote
progress towards self-government to reduce the burdens of administering these territories.
The A mandates were to prove the most complex to resolve, in part because of continued
warfare in the region after the First World War, as well as the expectations of the population, and
of certain local notables, for much more independence than was expected in Africa or the
Pacific. Although the Treaty of Sevres had theoretically ended the war between the Ottomans
and the Allies, the military realities in Turkey meant that this treaty did not come fully into force.
These realities were primarily the rise of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his armies fighting against
the Greeks in western Anatolia, and Armenia, which made the allocation of mandates impossible
until the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.247 Although the United States had not
been at war with the Ottomans or with the new Turkish government, and thus were not entitled to
be represented officially in the creation of the Treaty of Lausanne, it still sent an observer of
ambassadorial rank on the grounds that “it will be practically impossible for the Allies to conduct
negotiations without dealing with matters in which this [American] Government is interested.”248
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The United States held that it was entitled to a voice in the resolution of the situation in the
Middle East because it had been a party to the victory over Germany, which had been a
fundamental factor in the ultimate victory of the Allies over the Ottoman Empire.249 The
situation in the Middle East was further complicated by the wartime agreements among the
Allies for the division of the territory, such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, as well as
statements like the Balfour Declaration and the correspondence between the British government
and Emir Hussein of Mecca that had made promises to various peoples over their future rights in
the Middle East.250 These existing arrangements, coupled with the newfound importance of
petroleum in international affairs and the complex military and diplomatic situation in the Near
East, created a very difficult set of circumstances for the resolution of the A mandates.
The Middle East was conquered by mainly British forces, with some assistance from
other Allied forces as well as Arab armies operating as part of the Arab Revolt under the
leadership of the Sheriff of Mecca and his four sons, most notably Emir Faisal.251 Unlike the
other colonial theatres, the Middle East was not conquered by Allied forces until 1918, leaving
the situation more fluid and volatile than in Africa or the Pacific. The military forces in the
Middle East had also included a large number of Indians under British command, particularly in
Mesopotamia, giving the India Office considerable influence over the future settlement of the
region.252 The use of Indian troops in the Middle East was perceived as risky by the British
because of many of them were Muslim, and viewed the Ottoman Sultan through his role as
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Caliph, and may have been conflicted about fighting against their coreligionists.253 This issue
was further exacerbated by the view among many Indian Muslims that the Arab Revolt
represented apostasy on the part of Sharif Hussein and his family.254 This issue provoked a rift
between British authorities from the India Office, who came to support the claims of Ibn Saud,
and those in Cairo who supported Sharif Hussein and the Hashemites.255 British interests in the
Middle East were to a great extent motivated by the desire to secure supply lines to India, which
was made more serious by resistance to British dominance in Egypt culminating in the 1919
Revolution, in which the revolutionaries explicitly tied their demands for independence to
Wilson’s Fourteen Points.256
French claims over Syria and Arab claims of independence further complicated matters in
the Middle East, and issues over oil reserves around Mosul involving the British, French,
Americans, and Turks gave an economic incentive for further involvement in the situation. The
assignment of mandatories in the Middle East followed the basic pattern envisioned in the SykesPicot agreement, in part because at the 1920 San Remo Conference where the future of the
Middle East was settled among the European powers, the United States was present only as an
observer.257 At San Remo the decision was made to assign Syria, including Lebanon, to France
and Mesopotamia and Palestine to Britain, leaving Arabia proper in the hands of the local Arab
tribes and states.258 The Middle East held much more potential for conflict between Britain and
France than did other colonial areas in Africa and the Pacific, most of which were centered on oil
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extraction around Mosul or around French aversion to the existence of an independent Arab
government in Syria.259 These complex issues led to considerable delays in the implementation
of the A mandates, which were not confirmed by the League until 1922, though they lacked a
solid legal basis until the formal surrender of these territories to the Allies pursuant to the Treaty
of Lausanne in 1923.260
Syria and Lebanon were treated as a unit for the purposes of assigning mandates. France
had interests in the region of Lebanon and coastal Syria stretching back to the Crusades, which
were called upon by the French imperialist lobby and the right-wing to support their ambitions
for French expansion into the Levant.261 Syria had been conquered during the war by a
combination of British and Arab troops, with the British evacuating their posts in favour of the
French in late 1919, around the same time that Emir Faisal became the head of an Arab
government based in Damascus that claimed to be the authentic representative of all of Syria,
including Palestine and Lebanon.262 While the French initially supported Faisal’s regime and had
some agreements with them concerning an independent federation in Syria under Faisal’s rule
within a French mandate, once the British had withdrawn in late 1919 and French troops arrived
in Syria, they quickly moved to overthrow Faisal with the Battle of Maysalun and the occupation
of Damascus, leading Faisal to flee to British-controlled areas.263 American public opinion was
on the side of the Arabs, whom they viewed as underdogs akin to other nationalities who were
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striving for independence.264 The Americans at this point had sent the King-Crane Commission
to the Middle East, and had discovered that the locals preferred no mandate, or failing that, an
American or British mandate to a French one. However the recommendations of the commission
had little impact, and the Americans and British were unwilling to press the French to maintain
Faisal’s government in the interest of maintaining good relations between the French and
British.265 In the end the French were able to establish control over Syria under a mandatory
regime without establishing a single local government for the whole territory, instead creating a
series of provinces for the different groups in Syria and Lebanon, in what appears to have been a
divide-and-conquer strategy to retain control over the region.266
French policy in Syria ran counter to the basic concept of the A mandates by failing to
promote an indigenous government “which can be provisionally recognised subject to the
rendering of administrative advice and assistance … until such time as they are able to stand
alone.”267 The Allied and Associated Powers as a whole failed here to uphold the section of
Article 22 which stated that “The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration
in the selection of the Mandatory.”268 Despite these failures to uphold the “sacred trust” of the
mandates system, the mandate for Syria was not a complete failure from the perspective of
Wilsonian idealism; the mandate became open to economic and missionary activity from all
members of League, as well as the United States, and the locals gained the right to petition the
international community against the French. The Syrian and Lebanese people used this right
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more than any other mandate, sending a total of 1322 petitions and communications, nearly half
of the total received from all of the mandates combined.269
While the French brusquely ignored the wishes of the local populations in Syria and
pushed aside the indigenous government, the British felt more compelled to adhere to their
wartime agreements. The trouble for the British in this respect was felt most acutely in Palestine,
where they had made such starkly opposing commitments to the Zionists and the Arabs that it
would prove impossible to fulfil both. The Balfour Declaration was issued in November 1917
and promised British support for “the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the
Jewish people…”270 This declaration was reiterated numerous times by British officials during
and after the war and was included in the terms agreed upon by Allies at the San Remo
Conference, as well as being inserted into the final draft of the Mandate for Palestine.271 The
Balfour Declaration had explicitly provided that “nothing should be done which might prejudice
the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine…”272 This alone
would have been a difficult provision for the British authorities to uphold, as the mass
immigration of Jews to Palestine envisioned by the Zionists would necessarily have an impact
upon the existing communities. The stated goal of achieving self-governing institutions as
described in Article 2 of the Mandate for Palestine practically guaranteed that conflicts would
arise between the Jewish and non-Jewish populations, and placed Britain in the difficult position
of attempting to mediate between the two.273 The mandate agreement for Palestine encouraged
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local autonomy, and provided that a Jewish agency should be recognized by the British as a
public body for “advising and co-operating” with the British for the purpose of establishing the
Jewish national home.274 The extensive rights granted to Jewish immigrants and institutions by
the terms of the mandate allowed them to create a sort of state-in-waiting and to operate largely
autonomously with British support.275
The inclusion of the Balfour Declaration into the mandate for Palestine was supported
most strongly by Lloyd George and Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour; for Lloyd George, support
was at least partially based on wartime considerations to convince Jews around the world to
support the Allies, but for Balfour support for Zionism seems to have developed into a sincerely
held belief.276 The Americans accepted the Balfour Declaration, in part because of Jewish
lobbyists in the United States, but also because Wilson was personally sympathetic to the idea of
creating a Jewish national home in Palestine, though his support was unofficial.277 The French
were also supportive of Zionism, in part because they wanted to ensure that they would continue
to hold some influence in Palestine and ensure that Zionists would not rely exclusively on British
support.278 Faisal was sympathetic to the Zionist cause, having met the key Zionist delegate
Chaim Weizmann in Paris, though it was recognized by all concerned that their goals were
fundamentally irreconcilable.279 This broad support for the Balfour Declaration was
counterbalanced by the promises made to the Hashemite family in the Hussein-McMahon
correspondence, and the basic notion of self-determination which held that the local Arab
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population ought to be the beneficiaries of the mandate’s provision of “administrative advice and
assistance until such time as they are able to stand alone.”280 This state of affairs produced for the
British a sort of dual mandate in Palestine, one to the Jews to whom they had promised the land,
and one to the existing Arab-majority population.
In the end the British administered Palestine more like a B mandate than an A mandate.
By installing a High Commissioner as the highest authority and allowing for the creation of
separate institutions by the Zionists, the British did not recognize Palestine as a provisionally
independent nation as Article 22 of the League Covenant prescribed.281 Some have interpreted
British policies in Palestine as being connected to issues in Egypt and a desire for a position
close to the Suez canal following the 1919 Revolution.282 While this may have had an influence
on British policy, it seems that the British did honestly attempt to uphold the terms of their
mandate in Palestine by supporting the development of self-governing institutions on the part of
the Zionists; the difficulty was more in the impossible double-bind in which the British found
themselves. This is not to say that the British are without fault in the matter of the Mandate for
Palestine. Rather, their vacillating policies were the result of a set of mutually incompatible
obligations to the Jews and to the local Arabs, which ended up undermining the character of the
A mandate classification for the region. While the United States played only a minor role in the
creation of the mandate for Palestine, one can clearly see the influence of Wilsonian ideology
and of American colonial precedent in the goal of self-government being placed as the highest
objective in the mandate. Furthermore, the United States was able to obtain in Palestine, as it did
in other mandates, the same rights as League members including open-door economic access,
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and access for missionaries, which was of particular importance in a place of such religious
significance.283

The Case of Iraq
While the Palestine mandate had numerous inherent difficulties in attaining the
provisional independence envisioned in the League Covenant, this goal proved much more
attainable in Mesopotamia. This area had been taken by British troops, largely from India,
through a series of campaigns that culminated in the signing of an armistice with the Ottomans in
1918 before the British had entirely occupied the region.284 Mesopotamia, or Iraq as it came to be
called, was comprised of three Ottoman vilayets, those of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Despite
wartime agreements with the French regarding the division of the vilayet of Mosul, following the
British military occupation of the region and changes to international agreements pertaining to
the Middle East, France conceded pre-eminence in the region to Britain and its inclusion into
Mesopotamia.285 It was this northern region of Iraq around the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk that
the major foreign interest in the region lay, mainly because of the oil resources to be found
there.286 The importance of Mesopotamian oil was connected with wartime experiences in
Britain and France which had come to realize the precarity of relying on foreign supplies, and
both turned to Mesopotamia as an alternative to foreign, chiefly American, supplies.287
Wrangling over Mesopotamian oil supplies involved the United States, Britain, and France, and a
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number of private concerns such as the American Standard Oil Company, on whose behalf the
governments involved were sometimes accused of acting.288
The precise negotiations were extremely complex and could fill a volume more than
equal in length to this one; it will suffice to note that the primary interest of the three powers in
Mesopotamia was oil, and that in their negotiations the primary consideration was how the oil
resources of the region were to be partitioned. It was on this basis that the United States protested
the confirmation of the mandates without its consent, causing additional delays in the
confirmation of the A and B mandates.289 The issue of Mesopotamian oil touched on the key
American consideration for the mandates after the Wilson administration, open-door economic
access; the Americans were concerned that the British intended to establish a monopoly over
Mesopotamian oil and wished to ensure that they would receive a share.290 The French had
received the former German interests in the primarily British-owned Turkish Petroleum
Company at the San Remo Conference in return for facilitating the transportation of
Mesopotamian oil to the Mediterranean.291 The Americans, not having been full participants at
San Remo, did not receive a similar share, and protested the British government vigorously on
the basis of ensuring commercial equality in Mesopotamia for their oil companies.292 The
Americans were clearly using their considerable diplomatic power to support the interests of
private American companies, but were also leveraging Wilsonian principles to pursue their
material interests. This is representative of the two strains of American influence over the system
coming together. On the one hand there is the Wilsonian idealism infused into the system in the
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form of the open-door provisions of the A mandates, and on the other is the United States
behaving a manner reminiscent of their actions with respect to American resource extraction
companies in Latin America in which government agencies utilize their diplomatic leverage to
the advantage of private American interests.
Ultimately the issue of oil concessions was solved by Britain granting Americans certain
limited investment rights in the Turkish Petroleum Company, in effect securing American
participation in the monopoly they had originally sought to avoid.293 In the meantime, however,
the British had been forced to suppress an uprising in Iraq in 1920 at tremendous cost, and the
resulting outcry placed a great deal of pressure on the British government to reduce expenditures
in the region.294 The resulting policies enacted by the High Commissioner in Baghdad, Sir Percy
Cox, was to begin constructing an indigenous government to assume executive control, with a
conference in Cairo selecting former Syrian leader Faisal to be the new king of Iraq in March
1921.295 This was followed in 1922 by the drafting of a treaty of alliance with Iraq whereby the
indigenous government assumed nearly full control over its own affairs, subject to British
advisers and complemented by a continued British military presence.296 This military presence
underwent considerable changes after the revolt, with the desire to reduce expenditures foremost
in its design, resulting in a reliance on air power to maintain control.297 Iraq was held to be
uniquely suited to the use of air power because of its because of its geographical location in the
middle of British positions in Asia and the Mediterranean, which would allow Baghdad to act as
the “pivot” of an imperial air force stretching across British possessions and facilitating both
power projection and the movement of goods, and its topography, which offered relatively little
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cover to insurgents, and plentiful landing areas, and.298 The use of air power, in addition to
reducing the cost of maintaining order, allowed the British to remain an invisible hand in Iraqi
military affairs, unseen until they felt it appropriate, and to hide their numbers from
insurgents.299 This strategy is reminiscent of contemporary American strategies in Latin
America, where indigenous governments were left in control of local matters, but always with
the knowledge that American military forces, could arrive at any moment should the American
government feel that its interests were being threatened.
The brutality of air control in Iraq, given the imprecision of contemporary aerial warfare
methods, was justified largely on the basis of racial and civilizational notions that the Arabs were
accustomed to visiting brutality on one another, and that their religiosity and fatalism meant that
the British were merely participating in the warfare that was customary in the region.300 To
coordinate their air power in Iraq the British relied on political agents, whose presence was
facilitated by the provisions of the mandates system as they were advisers to the Iraqi
government, and allowed them to maintain a relatively humane image with the population as
they were not seen to be actively engaged in the violent pacification efforts.301 This sort of
indirect control was facilitated both by new technologies and the political system erected for the
mandates as a whole. The British willingness to create a functioning indigenous government in
Iraq, unlike in Palestine or the French in Syria, reflects Britain’s priorities in Mesopotamia,
which were centered on resource extraction rather than on territorial control. This arrangement
bears a striking resemblance to American colonial methodologies in the so-called “Banana
Republics” of Latin America, though during the 1920s its governmental structure appears more
similar to that of the Philippines, in which an indigenous government existed subject to some
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civilian oversight by the United States, and a considerable ability on their part to call in military
force should their “advice” be disregarded.
In 1924 the League of Nations formally accepted the treaty of alliance between Great
Britain and Iraq, creating a more advanced form of A mandate. Under this new arrangement the
indigenous government operated more independently but still adhered to the provisions of a
mandate, such as furnishing an annual report to the League and the right of League to review and
veto any proposed modifications to the treaty.302 The 1922 treaty was the first major step along
the pathway to Iraqi independence, in which Britain began to reduce its role to an advisory
capacity while ensuring that other nations would not be able to wield political influence in the
region (such as by stipulating that British agreement was necessary for the appointment of
foreign nationals by the government of Iraq).303 In 1926 a new treaty was signed between Great
Britain and Iraq; it largely continued the provisions of the 1922 treaty, but contained more
emphasis on how Iraq might be admitted to the League of Nations and how Britain would
operate should they fail to be admitted.304 While these treaties had been accepted by the League
of Nations, to ensure their rights in Iraq the United States, Britain, and Iraq, signed a treaty in
January 1930 guaranteeing Americans the same rights as League members in Iraq.305 By April of
1930 the British government began preparations to propose Iraq for membership in the League of
Nations in 1932, which would terminate their mandate; by the end of June they had signed a new
treaty with Iraq defining their relationship following the termination of the mandate.306 That
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these negotiations began shortly after the conclusion of a treaty with the United States
concerning their rights in Iraq suggests that the British were concerned that the Americans might
once again lodge a formal protest on the basis that their rights in the mandates had been
infringed.
The terms of the treaties made it clear that Iraqi independence would be granted subject
to the maintenance of British air bases in the territory, as well as securing British lines of
communication, both of which would enable the British to intervene should the Iraqi government
undertake activities that were detrimental to British interests.307 Britain’s ability to intervene in
Iraq must be understood as primarily existing in order to protect oil supplies coming from the
country, and the private interests involved in oil extraction and transportation. In this the
parallels to American behavior in Latin America in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine are
evident. Britain retained its forces in Iraq and maintained a strong advisory relationship with the
Iraqi government such that the Iraqi government’s independence was functionally contingent on
its willingness to cooperate with British interests, all of which was designed to facilitate resource
extraction by private companies.308 That the United States and League members had been able to
secure commercial rights in Mesopotamia was the result of American pressure for the open-door
in A and B mandates during and after the Paris Peace Conference. The British thus found
themselves in a position in the Middle East similar to the American position in South America.
That the British were constructing a neocolonial sphere of influence in the Middle East akin to
that held by the Americans in Latin America is further evinced by their willingness to see Arabia
remain independent, initially as multiple small states but later amalgamated by the House of
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Saud into Saudi Arabia, where their primary interest was not to control the territory, but rather to
ensure that no other power gained significant influence.309
Overall, one can see that while the mandates system did not in practice live up to
Wilson’s idealism, it did incorporate several key features that differentiated the mandates from
other colonial regimes. The emphasis placed on open-door economic policies, missionary access,
and progression towards self-government reflects American colonial preoccupations as
evidenced by their similarities to American policies in China, the Philippines, and Latin
America. While Iraq was the only mandate to achieve its independence during the existence of
the mandates system, the path it took through an ever-shrinking British presence tied to the
ability of the local government to safeguard foreign resource extraction and to cooperate with
Britain is emblematic of the desired result for the mandates as a whole, namely a slow
progression from outright European-style colonialism towards an Americanized neocolonial
form akin to Latin America. The other mandates did not achieve this sort of independence for a
variety of reasons, chiefly the diplomatic realities of European politics, as well as the racial and
civilizational logic enshrined in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. However,
even in the B and C mandates, in which self-government was less of a priority, one can still see
key American provisions incorporated into the structure of the mandates system, implemented
even after the United States failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles or join the League. Most
notably open-door economic access in the B mandates, international oversight in the B and C
mandates, and the prohibition on fortifications or the raising of troops for use outside of the
territory which would disincentivize continued direct colonial control by undercutting the
protectionist and geostrategic logics which undergirded much of the existing colonial system.
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Conclusion
Although the mandates system did not live up to the lofty goals espoused by Woodrow
Wilson and other Allied leaders during the First World War, the system did represent a
significant departure from prewar European colonialism. As with the design of the system during
the Paris Peace Conference, the implementation of the mandates necessitated numerous
concessions to various interest groups, chiefly colonial lobbies in France and the British
Dominions. These concessions undermined to some extent the Americanized character of the
colonialism envisioned by the mandates system, but they were unable to vitiate key stipulations
of the system: the ultimate goal of self-government for mandated territories; the inclusion of
open-door economic policies in the A and B mandates which helped to undercut the economic
logic of European-style colonialism; and the inclusion of international supervisory mechanisms
under the aegis of the League of Nations that ensured at least some level of compliance with the
stipulations of the mandates system. It is chiefly these features that differentiate the nature of
colonial control within mandated territories from that of the pre-existing colonies of the
European powers, and it is in these features that one can see most clearly the influence of
American colonial ideologies in reshaping colonial systems after the First World War.
This analysis builds on existing literature that connects the mandates system to earlier
precedents, including the examples in the first chapter noting the internationalization of
colonialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries following the Congo and
Algeciras conferences. 310 While these precedents are important, the role of the United States and
its unique variant of colonial ideology has been largely left out of such analyses, despite the
importance of precedents from American practices in Latin America and the Philippines to
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understanding the design of the mandates system. The current body of interpretation surrounding
the influence of Wilsonian ideology has been largely aimed at anti-colonial movements, on
which this ideology certainly had a profound impact, but this is not the only way Wilsonian
ideology impacted the colonial world.311 It is commonplace to dismiss the role of Wilsonism in
the formation of the mandates as a convenient rhetorical cover for the European powers to
expand their colonial holdings while paying lip-service to the concept of self-determination for
colonial peoples. Instead, this analysis has shown that the ideology had a profound influence on
the design of the mandates system and, to a lesser extent, on its functioning.312 Whether this took
place in the context of a retort to the newly prominent Bolshevik ideology, as some authors have
asserted, or to assuage the desires of anti-colonial movements within the metropoles of the
colonial powers, many authors have been quick to dismiss the mandates system as little more
than cloak for traditional colonialism.313 While there is some truth to these interpretations, in that
the ideological threat of Bolshevism and the desire of the European governments to dispel
criticisms and resistance to their colonial control motivated acquiescence with a Wilsonian
conception of the mandates system. Still, the existing literature tends to understate the role of the
United States and its ideologies in the creation and implementation of this system.
Some authors do note the key role played by the United States in the formulation of the
mandates system. However they tend not to recognize the fundamentally Americanized character
of the system as it was designed. They focus more on the later stages of American participation
in which the United States utilized its powerful negotiating position to ensure it would receive
shares of the spoils in mandated territories, most notably Iraq, and less on the influence of
American ideology and precedent on the conceptualization and design of the system.314 Such
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analyses offer considerable support to the contentions of this paper, even if they fail to account
for the lasting importance of the Americanization of the mandates system on international
colonialism – largely because many of these analyses were written prior to the Second World
War. To this effect my conclusions help to tie America’s entry into global and colonial politics in
the interwar period to developments after the Second World War and during the Cold War in the
shaping of international frameworks for decolonization. They emphasize the importance of selfdetermination and self-government in colonial areas as a fundamental feature of both their own
colonialism and their attempts to influence international systems more broadly.
While the present analysis develops upon ideas of the American role in reshaping the
global order in the aftermath of the First World War, the true promise of this research is that it
offers great potential for further investigation into American colonial ideology’s influence on
decolonization and international governance during and after the interwar period. The
importance of this research lies in understanding the nature of mandatory administration and its
implications. Nowhere is this clearer than in the former British Mandate for Palestine, where
there remains a great deal of contention over legitimate rights to the land and sovereignty; this
can be traced directly back to the mandate and the promises made by the British administration
and international community through the League of Nations. One of the most promising avenues
for future research is in the legal sphere, where the nature of sovereignty in the mandates had
been hotly debated since their creation. This is particularly true in the notion of divided
sovereignty or the concept that the mandatory powers were acting in loco parentis for the
inhabitants of mandated territories, leaving many questions regarding their rights of disposal of
territory and other property within the mandated territories. The results of the mandates system
have been generally poor, and one need only look towards the plight of the former A mandates in
the twenty-first century to see that the issues with which the mandatory administrations grappled
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have not gone anywhere. This suggests that the mandates system and its successors failed to
produce desirable results. A deeper understanding of this system as a sort of bridge between the
colonialism of early twentieth century and the neocolonialism of the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries may help to illustrate the failures of this system and ways to prevent
repetition of their mistakes.
The changes to colonialism that took place during the twentieth century were profound.
The shift from a world dominated by a few mostly European empires to a world of nation states
in which very few colonies remain has been a momentous change for the colonial world, and
comprehending this change requires understanding not only the movements within these
countries, but also how changes to the international order facilitated the process of
decolonization. Despite the success of the decolonization movement, its results have been
decidedly mixed, with many countries continuing to be greatly influenced by the governments
and private citizens of their former colonial rulers. In many contexts the transition from
colonialism to independence has done little to ameliorate the economic disparities in these areas,
or to reduce the influence of foreign corporations in the most lucrative sectors of their
economies. These changes can best be understood by looking to their progenitors and precedents,
which are most evident in the history of areas that gained their independence during the late
nineteenth century, most prominently in Latin America. Looking at the relationship between
these areas and more powerful countries such as the United States helps us to understand the
interactions between newly independent states and global powers in economic and political terms
that facilitated the transition from colonialism to neocolonialism.
The mandates were some of the last colonies acquired by the European powers, and
represent the beginning of a process whereby the acquisition of territory through conquest came
to be seen as unacceptable in international law. It has become an accepted part of the
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international order that states are not entitled to occupy foreign lands without legitimate reasons
beyond self-interested economic or strategic motives, and one can see in the mandates system the
beginnings of this ideology with the enshrining of the principles of international oversight and
the goal of self-government. Even after the Second World War territory that was removed from
the administration of the defeated powers in the colonial sphere was subject to international
oversight, as in the case of the United Nations Trusteeships that were established in many Pacific
islands formerly under Japanese mandate, or in Italian Somaliland where the former colonial title
was transformed into a trusteeship. This shows that the international community came to accept
that existing colonial titles could not be made subject to the principles enshrined of the mandates
system (and its direct successor the trusteeship system). Instead, whenever the title to a colonial
territory became open to negotiation, the principles of oversight and self-government should be
applied as legal requirements for the continuation of colonial rule. These changes coincide with
the rise of the United States as one of the world’s preeminent powers, and the incorporation of
American principles into systems of colonial administration at this time cannot have been a
coincidence.
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Appendix 1
Mandate:

Mandatory:

Terms Defined by Council:

Palestine

United Kingdom

July 24, 1922

Trans-Jordan

United Kingdom

Sept. 16, 1922

Syria and Lebanon

France

July 24, 1922

Cameroons

France

July 18, 1922

Cameroons

United Kingdom

July 18, 1922

Ruanda-Urundi

Belgium

July 20, 1922

Tanganyika (German East Africa)

United Kingdom

July 20, 1922

Togoland

France

July 18, 1922

Togoland

United Kingdom

July 18, 1922

North Pacific Islands

Japan

Dec. 17, 1920

Nauru

British Empire (Australia acting) Dec. 17, 1920

New Guinea and Islands

Australia

Dec. 17, 1920

South-West Africa

South Africa

Dec. 17, 1920

Western Samoa

New Zealand

Dec. 17, 1920

“A” Mandates

“B” Mandates

“C” Mandates

All information in this table is derived from Joseph V. Fuller and Tyler V. Dennett, eds., “Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference, 1919.
Volume XIII,” Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States. The Paris Peace
Conference, 1919. Volume XIII § (1947), 101-102.
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Appendix 2
Map of League of Nations mandates and mandatories

Image source:
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_league_of_nations_mandate.png
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